


# THE DIRTY DEEDS OF SILICON VALLEY VOLUME TWO



Think Corrupt



# ***The Dirty Deeds Of Silicon Valley***

## ***Volume Two***

***A detailed look at the people who run political bribery schemes  
in big tech***

***By Westin Parker And The Wiki Team***

***Draft 1.6 – Sneak Peek - Stay Tuned For Future Revisions***

## FORWARD

Welcome to Volume Two!

As you recall from Volume One, when people think about electoral bribery and political corruption, they probably can't imagine anything more than a man passing a manila envelope of cash to another man under a table at a funky diner.

The U.S. Department of Energy, The State Department, The Environmental Protection Agency and other agencies hand out money and stock market valuation 'pump perks' that one can use to make billions of dollars in private profits. Each of these agencies claims to hand out the cash on a "merits" basis but history has proven that to be a total lie. A chart of the last 20 years of their decisions shows that only insiders who funded the political campaigns of the current President get the money even though: 1.) their technologies or programs were the worst of all of the applicants 2. ) competing applicants had better value in their proposals and 3.) competing applicants tried harder.

For example, while a handful of people at the Department of Energy actually thought they were 'evaluating proposal merits', *everyone else* at the Department of Energy knew that the money was hard-wired to campaign insiders Elon Musk, Eric Schmidt and their friends. Products that 1.) cost the public less to buy, 2.) were safer, 3.) were not sourced and staffed overseas, 4.) tasked American factories instead of overseas factories, 5.) had a better Bill Of Materials, 6.) were easier to manufacture, 7.) did not use toxic materials, 8.) did not rely on invading another country, 9.) had a far better debt ratio in their companies than Tesla had, and that had hundreds of other advantages: were ignored because Elon Musk or Eric Schmidt were afraid of having to compete with those companies.

In other words, the Department of Energy pandered to Elon Musk because Elon Musk was too big of a pussy to face any competition in a fair fight! Silicon Valley oligarchs now control most federal agencies and tell them what to do and what not to do. Their lobbyists, law firms and insiders are their operatives that pass-along the directives.

In fact, modern bribery involves every other form of hidden payola *except* the envelope-under-the-table. The tricks of corruption have evolved. This book is dedicated to exposing those tactics, which are destroying America. Every citizen suffers when their elected and appointed public officials sell the government like it was a garage sale.

That is going to change. I swear to you, based on new open-source forensics software and millions of voters using the internet: ***"Deeds done in the dark will always come to light"***

I, and my co-authors, knew Mayor's of San Francisco and their families, U.S. Senators and their families, Senior White House executives and their families and the people that bribed them. Most of the tech oligarchs and politicians who spend billions of dollars controlling the media to create a facade of kindly altruism around themselves are murdering, lying, sick, thieving sociopaths. Their dirty deeds don't come-dirt- cheap. Their dirty deeds involve trillions of dollars of dirty money taken from taxpayers pockets! We now have a whole global team of contributors helping expose the facts about these crooks.

## Page 4 - EXHIBIT 83 – Case # 22-cv-1107-TSH, Norcal 9th District.pdf

Should federal law enforcement bosses at the West Coast SEC, FTC, FBI, DOJ, and other offices, be arrested for refusing to arrest crooks Elon Musk, Eric Schmidt, Larry Page, etc.? Thousands of reports of crimes against these tech mobsters have been filed yet they get “protection” instead of “prosecution”! Why are there almost never any arrests of these overt crooks?

The lawyers at the “corporate cover-up” crooked law firms of Perkins Coie, Mofo, Covington & Burling, and Wilson Sonsini certainly should be arrested for making the law take a right-turn straight up Satan’s anus.

The dirty tricks operatives Steve Westly, Steve Spinner, David Plouffe, et al, certainly deserve some federal prison pick-up-the-soap time.

If you doubt or deny any of these facts, please meet us at 450 Golden Gate Ave, on the 13<sup>th</sup> Floor in the investigator’s conference room to present any facts you may have. On a live global web broadcast at that location, we accept any challenge to the veracity of these claims. If you can supply credible evidence that any assertion in here is either 1.) not true or 2.) intentioned parody that is not parody, then we will remove the assertion.

In intimate detail, here is more about how the crooks operate:

FORWARD.....	3
THE BIGGEST SCUMBAGS.....	6
CONTROLLING THOUGHTS BY DELETING ALL OTHER VIEWPOINTS.....	18
STEVE JOBS WAS A CREEPY LITTLE SHIT.....	22
STANFORD UNIVERSITY BUILDS ARROGANT SELF-CENTERED CRIMINAL SCUMBAGS.	31
HOW SAN FRANCISCO TURNED INTO A SHIT-HOLE.....	41
SILICON VALLEY’S LIES ABOUT ITSELF.....	78
ADDITIONAL LINKS, EVIDENCE, BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES.....	87
MUCH MORE COMING. STAY TUNED.....	382

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This book is cooperatively, interactively, collaboratively, authored by the individuals who witnessed these crimes, the reporters who documented these crimes, the public who suffered from these crimes and the investigators who investigated these crimes. A special thanks to the tipsters and whistle-blowers inside the White House, The FBI, The Department of Energy and City Hall's who made this all possible.

The best punishment for these bastards is to make their companies and assets lose billions of dollars in stock value by using news media, CIA and forensic tactics. The main weapon that is being used is: THE TRUTH! It is the one thing they fear most!

Please re-post these volumes on torrent sites, blogs, and your website to help all members of the public get involved in the interdiction of the crooks mentioned herein.



## THE BIGGEST SCUMBAGS

If you visit a little government website located at [www.pacer.gov](http://www.pacer.gov), you can see who is getting sued from the Silicon Valley Cartel. You can also see the divorce records of the Silicon Valley oligarchs.

What you will see from a tour of Pacer.gov is that the Silicon Valley tech companies have stolen most of the technology that they make their billions from. They took it from smaller inventors and then ran attacks on those inventors when they reported it.

On Pacer you will see that the heads of almost every Silicon Valley tech company and venture capital firm were divorced in horrific divorce cases involving hookers, sex trafficking, sex slaves, wife beating, sex cults, drugs, extortion and other lovely things. Their own social records prove that Silicon Valley's inhabitants are the BIGGEST SCUMBAGS ON EARTH. You will shudder when you read about the famous VC with an "anal sex slave" and the famous tech CEO who kicked his girlfriend over 100 times and the Facebook VR boss who was arrested hunting for children to have sex with.

You will see that Steve Jobs and Elon Musk did not invent anything. They stole their ideas from others. They even came in, lied to, spied on and thieved off some of the authors of this book series.

When you try to sue a Silicon Valley tech start-up you find that there are only a handful of law firms in the U.S.A. that are qualified and staffed to be able to undertake such a lawsuit against any member of The Silicon Valley Cartel.

You then discover that EVERY SINGLE one of those law firms has already been hired by The Silicon Valley Cartel in order to "conflict you out" from getting adequate legal protection. If you try to go it alone, you can file a federal lawsuit for a few hundred bucks...but...You will immediately get it blocked by The Silicon Valley Cartel. They will have one of those law firms (that should have been working for you) file millions of dollars of paperwork that you can never afford to respond to and that you can never understand.

Even though the basic premise of American Democracy is that you have an equal right to the justice system: YOU DON'T HAVE ANY RIGHTS if you are fighting a member of The Silicon Valley Cartel.

You can't get a lawyer. You can't get a fair hearing. They can harm you for speaking out and they won't get in any trouble for doing so. The Constitution does not count in Silicon Valley and the U.S. Department of Justice won't get you your justice from the government because Eric Schmidt and Mark Zuckerberg bought part of the Government. The Silicon Valley Cartel spends tens of millions of dollars per year to influence the U.S. Patent Office to subtly change its laws in order to protect Google and remove all rights from small inventors. Google even lobbied to put its own lawyer, Michelle Lee, in charge of the U.S. Patent Office and, because the Obama White House was Google's bitch

See: THE ANDROID ADMINISTRATION from The Intercept, The Android Administration: Google's

remarkably close relationship with the Obama White House:

<https://theintercept.com/2016/04/22/googles-remarkably-close-relationship-with-the-obama-white-house-in-two-charts/>

“When President Obama announced his support last week for a Federal Communications Commission plan to open the market for cable set-top boxes — a big win for consumers, but also for Google — the cable and telecommunications giants who used to have a near-stranglehold on tech policy were furious,” David Dayen reports for The Intercept. “AT&T chief lobbyist Jim Cicconi lashed out at what he called White House intervention on behalf of ‘the Google proposal.’”

“He’s hardly the first to suggest that the Obama administration has become too close to the Silicon Valley juggernaut,” Dayen reports. “Over the past seven years, Google has created a remarkable partnership with the Obama White House, providing expertise, services, advice, and personnel for vital government projects.”

“Precisely how much influence this buys Google isn’t always clear. But consider that over in the European Union, Google is now facing two major antitrust charges for abusing its dominance in mobile operating systems and search. By contrast, in the U.S., a strong case to sanction Google was quashed by a presidentially appointed commission,” Dayen reports. “Google representatives attended White House meetings more than once a week, on average, from the beginning of Obama’s presidency through October 2015. Nearly 250 people have shuttled from government service to Google employment or vice versa over the course of his administration... Eric Schmidt, executive chairman of Alphabet, Google’s parent company, was an enthusiastic supporter of both of Obama’s presidential campaigns and has been a major Democratic donor.”

“Between January 2009 and October 2015, Google staffers gathered at the White House on 427 separate occasions. All told, 182 White House employees and 169 Google employees attended the meetings, with participation from almost every domestic policy and national security player in the West Wing,” Dayen reports. “The frequency of the meetings has increased practically every year, from 32 in 2009 to 97 in 2014. In the first 10 months of 2015, which is as far as the study goes, there were 85 Google meetings.”

**Much more in the full article – *recommended* – [here](#).**

**SEE ALSO:**

[Google averages one White House meeting per week during Obama administration](#) – March 25, 2015

[U.S. FTC report details how Google skewed search results in its own favor](#) – March 20, 2015

[Google’s antitrust settlement with U.S. FTC reshapes patent disputes](#) – January 5, 2013

[The FTC’s missed opportunity on Google](#) – January 4, 2013

[Obama to reward Google’s Schmidt with Cabinet post?](#) – December 5, 2012

[Consumer Watchdog calls for probe of Google’s inappropriate relationship with Obama administration](#) – January 25, 2011

You could not swing a cat, at the Obama White House, without hitting a Google insider. Obama did what Eric Schmidt and Larry Page told him to do!

**Let's take a look at Google's most pernicious thief: Larry Page.**

Larry Page has a million dollar per year+ expense account for handlers, security, brand manipulators and 'internet evacuation experts'. What!? You never heard of an internet evacuation expert? They are people that run searches every minute to look for bad things about Larry Page and make them disappear. Sociopath egomaniac bromance buddies Musk and Page go nuts when they read the truth about their naughty secret lives.

Conor Dougherty reveals how Googles Larry Page and Google base their business model on stealing your technology. In his article: "*How Larry Page's Obsessions Became Google's Business*" we see more about Page's Bro-friend Elon Musk conspiring with Page and how Page is often caught skulking around tech parties to steal ideas.

Three years ago, Charles Chase, an engineer who manages Lockheed Martin's nuclear fusion program, was sitting on a white leather couch at Google's Solve for X conference when a man he had never met knelt down to talk to him. (*It was Page trying to spy out info to steal for an Alphabet project*)

They spent 20 minutes discussing how much time, money and technology separated humanity from a sustainable fusion reaction — that is, how to produce clean energy by mimicking the sun's power — before Mr. Chase thought to ask the man his name.

"I'm Larry Page," the man said. He realized he had been talking to Google's billionaire co-founder and chief executive.

"He didn't have any sort of pretension like he shouldn't be talking to me or 'Don't you know who you're talking to?'" Mr. Chase said. "We just talked."

Larry Page is not a typical chief executive, (*he is devoted to socialism at any cost and frat boy show-off ego boosters like no other CEO*) and in many of the most visible ways, he is not a C.E.O. at all. Corporate leaders tend to spend a good deal of time talking at investor conferences or introducing new products on auditorium stages. Mr. Page, who is 42, has not been on an earnings call since 2013, and the best way to find him at Google I/O — an annual gathering where the company unveils new products — is to ignore the main stage and follow the scrum of fans and autograph seekers who mob him in the moments he steps outside closed doors. (*Page can't take the heat of a real media inquiry*)

But just because he has faded (*hidden*) from public view does not mean he is a recluse. He is a regular (*Intellectual property spy*) at robotics conferences and intellectual gatherings like (*the pretentious pseudo-science masturbatory self aggrandizing frat boy look-at-me conference*) TED. Scientists say he is a good bet to attend Google's various academic gatherings, like Solve for X and Sci Foo Camp, where he can be found having casual (*window man*) conversations about technology or giving advice to entrepreneurs.

Mr. Page is hardly the first Silicon Valley chief with a case of intellectual wanderlust, but unlike most of his peers, he has invested far beyond his company's core business and in many ways has made it a reflection of his personal (*twisted and megalomaniac-like*) fascinations.

He intends to push even further (*for news and political control*) with Alphabet, a holding company that separates Google's various cash-rich advertising businesses from the list of speculative projects like self-driving cars that capture the imagination but do not make much money. Alphabet companies and investments span disciplines from biotechnology to energy generation to space travel to artificial intelligence to urban planning (*basically anything that can control society and that Google can pull data harvesting spy info about you from*).



## Page 9 - EXHIBIT 83 – Case # 22-cv-1107-TSH, Norcal 9th District.pdf

Investors will get a good look at the scope of those ambitions on Feb. 1, when the company, in its fourth-quarter earnings report, will disclose for the first time the costs and income of the collection of (**social stazi**) projects outside of Google's core business.

As chief executive of Alphabet, Mr. Page is tasked with figuring how to spin Google's billions in advertising profits into new companies and industries. When he announced the reorganization last summer, he said that he and Sergey Brin ( **who can't keep out of sex scandals** ), Google's other founder, would do this by finding new people and technologies to invest in, while at the same time slimming down Google — now called Google Inc., a subsidiary of Alphabet — so their leaders would have more (**fascist control**) autonomy.

"In general, our model is to have a strong C.E.O. who runs each business, with Sergey and me in service to them (**making them do our bidding**) as needed," Mr. Page wrote in a letter to investors. He said that he and Mr. Brin would be responsible for picking those chief executives, monitoring their progress and determining their pay.

Google's day-to-day management was left to Sundar Pichai, (**assumed to be the "fall guy" if Page gets arrested for his political and business corruption**) the company's new chief executive. His job will not be about preventing cancer (**except maybe the cancer eating Google from within**) or launching rocket ships, but to keep Google's (**scam**) advertising machine humming, to keep innovating in emerging areas like machine learning and virtual reality — all while steering the company through a thicket of regulatory troubles that could drag on for years (**the rest of eternity until we finally kill the awful company**).

Mr. Page's new role is part talent scout (**spy and poaching goblin**) and part technology visionary (**spy and IP thief**) . He still has to find the chief executives of many of the other Alphabet businesses.

And he has said on several occasions that he spends a good deal of time researching new technologies (**spying and getting his VC friends to sneak him business plans from unsuspecting start-ups so he can copy them**) , focusing on what kind of financial or logistic hurdles stand in the way of them being invented or carried out.... Mr. Page has always had a wide range of (**weird**) interests. As an undergraduate at the University of Michigan, he worked on solar cars, music synthesizers and once proposed that the school build a tram through campus. He arrived at Stanford's computer science doctorate program in 1995, and had a list of initial research ideas, including self-driving cars and using the web's many hyperlinks to improve Internet search. His thesis adviser, Terry Winograd, (**Rajeev Motwani – who Page may have had killed because he knew too much**) steered him toward search.

"Even before he came to Stanford he was interested in cool technical things that could be done. (

<https://www.fastcompany.com/3015421/why-high-profile-tech> )

Mr. Winograd said. "What makes something interesting for him is a big technical challenge. It's not so much where it's headed but what the ride is like."...Mr. Page declined multiple requests for comment, and many of the people who spoke about him requested anonymity because they were not supposed to talk about internal company matters. ( <https://dailycaller.com/buzz/larry-page/> )

Many former Google employees who have worked directly with Mr. Page said his managerial modus operandi was to take new technologies or product ideas and generalize them to as many areas as possible. Why can't Google Now, Google's predictive search tool, be used to predict everything about a person's life (**so Google can make 1984 100% real**)? Why create a portal to shop for insurance when you can create a portal to shop for every product in the world?

But corporate success means corporate sprawl, and recently Google has seen a number of engineers and others leave ( **get harvested by** ) for younger (**equally corrupt**) rivals like Facebook and (**other**

**politically aligned insiders**) start-ups like Uber. Mr. Page has made personal appeals to some of them, and, at least in a few recent cases, has said he is worried that the company has become a difficult place for entrepreneurs ( **with any kind of moral compass** ), according to people who have met with him.

Part of Mr. Page's pitch included emphasizing how dedicated he was to "moonshots" ( **personal ego trips** ) like interplanetary travel, or offering employees time and money to pursue new projects of their own ( **which Page could later steal** ) . By breaking Google into Alphabet, Mr. Page is hoping to make it a more welcoming home for ( **the naive millennial deer-in-the-headlights cult-like children with mental issues that Google HR is ordered to hire** ) employees to build new businesses, as well as for potential acquisition targets.

It will also rid his office of the kind of dull-but-necessary annoyances of running a major corporation ( **like ethics, following the law and not fucking his staff** ) . Several recently departed Google staff members said that as chief executive of Google, Mr. Page had found himself in the middle of various turf wars, like how to integrate Google Plus, the company's struggling social media effort, with other products like YouTube, or where to put Google Now, which resided in the Android team but was moved to the search group ( **or whether or not to keep manipulating global politics** ).

What Is Separated Under Alphabet? Google: search, advertising, maps, YouTube and Android. Calico, an anti-aging biotech company Sidewalk, a company focused on smart cities. Nest, a maker of Internet-connected devices for the home. Fiber, high-speed Internet service in a number of American cities. Investment arms, such as Google Ventures and Google Capital. Incubator projects, such as Google X, which is developing self-driving cars and delivery drones. ( **This is done to manage all the lawsuits for all of the corruption and IP theft** ) ( **Burying Google money in various real estate holdings under various trade-names is huge tax evasion trick for Google** )

Such disputes are a big reason Mr. Page had been shedding managerial duties and delegating the bulk of his product oversight to Mr. Pichai, these people said. In a 2014 memo to the company announcing Mr. Pichai's promotion to product chief, Mr. Page said the move would allow him to "focus on the bigger picture" at Google and have more time to get the company's next generation of big bets off the ground.

People who have worked with Mr. Page say that he tries to guard his calendar, avoiding back-to-back meetings and leaving time to read, ( **do drugs, screw his staff, etc.** ) research and see new technologies that interest him ( **that he wants to steal** ). Given that he is worth in the neighborhood of \$40 billion and created the world's most famous website, Mr. Page has the tendency to attract a crowd when he attends technology events. At last year's Darpa Robotics Challenge, he was trailed closely by a handler who at times acted as a buffer between Mr. Page and would-be cellphone photographers. That commotion could annoy anyone, but it is particularly troubling for Mr. Page, who, because of damaged vocal cords, speaks just above a whisper and sometimes uses a microphone in small meetings.

And at Google, even events that are decidedly not normal aspire to a kind of casualness. Take the Camp, an exclusive and secretive event that Google holds at a resort in Sicily and where invitees have included Elon Musk, the chief executive of Tesla Motors and SpaceX, Lloyd C. Blankfein, the chief executive of Goldman Sachs, and Tory Burch, the fashion designer. ( **This is where political ideology programming takes place** )

People who work with Mr. Page or have spoken with him at conferences say he tries his best to blend in ( **sneak around** ), and, for the most part, the smaller groups of handpicked ( **crony** ) attendees at Google's academic and science gatherings, tend to treat him like a peer. The scope of his curiosity was apparent at Sci Foo Camp, an annual invitation-only conference that is sponsored by Google, O'Reilly Media and Digital Science.

The largely unstructured “unconference” begins when each of its ( *hand-selected crony clone insider* ) attendees — an eclectic batch of ( *hand-selected crony clone insider* ) astronomers, psychologists, physicists and others — write something that interests them on a small card and then paste it to a communal wall. Those notes become the basis for breakout talks on topics like scientific ethics or artificial intelligence.

The last conference was held during a weekend in June on Google’s Mountain View, Calif., campus, and Mr. Page was there for most of it. He did not host or give a speech, but mingled and went to talks, just like everyone else. That impressed ( *hand-selected crony clone insider* ) investors and computer scientists who did not expect to see so much of him, but researchers who had come from outside Silicon Valley barely noticed.

“I have a vague memory that some founder type person was walking through the crowd,” said Josh Peek, an assistant astronomer at the Space Telescope Science Institute in Baltimore.

Another benefit of these gatherings for the reserved Mr. Page is that they are mostly closed to the news media.

When Mr. Page does talk in public, he tends to focus on optimistic pronouncements ( *bullshit* ) about the future and Google’s desire to help humanity. Asked about current issues, like how mobile apps are challenging the web or how ad blockers are affecting Google’s business, he tends to dismiss it with something like, “People have been talking about that for a long time.” ( *...and I can’t discuss it because I am fucking the world over with it* ).

Lately, he has talked more about his belief that for-profit companies can be a force for social good and change. During a 2014 interview with Charlie Rose, Mr. Page said that instead of a nonprofit or philanthropic organization, he would rather leave his money to an entrepreneur like Mr. Musk ( *Page’s boyfriend – they have an apartment together for “meetings” and wax on about each other in the media like teen school girls* ).

Of course, for every statement Mr. Page makes about Alphabet’s technocorporate benevolence, you can find many competitors and privacy advocates holding their noses in disgust. ( *Because Page and Google are laying criminal scumbags* ) Technology companies like Yelp have accused the company of acting like a brutal monopolist that is using the dominance of its search engine to steer consumers toward Google services, even if that means giving the customers inferior information.

Financially speaking, Mr. Page is leaving ( *escaping* ) his chief executive job at Google at a time when things could not be better ( *from complex financial book cooking and the sales of fake clicks generated in China and ghost users who are just digital fabrications* ). The company’s revenue continues to grow about 20 percent a year, an impressive figure for any business, but particularly so for one that is on pace to generate approximately \$60 billion this year.

In fact, the company’s main business issue seems to be that it is doing too well. Google is facing antitrust charges in Europe, along with investigations in Europe and the United States. Those issues are now mostly ( *front boy skill* ) Mr. Pichai’s to worry about, as Mr. Page is out looking for the next big thing.

It is hard to imagine how even the most ambitious person could hope to revolutionize so many industries. And Mr. Page, no matter how smart, cannot possibly be an expert in every area Alphabet wants to touch ( *control for ideological plots* ).

His method is not overly technical. Instead, he tends to focus on how to make a sizable business out of whatever problem this or that technology might solve. Leslie Dewan, a nuclear engineer who founded a

company that is trying to generate cheap electricity from nuclear waste, also had a brief conversation with Mr. Page at the Solve For X conference.

She said he questioned her on things like modular manufacturing and how to find the right employees.

Dr. Dewan said Mr. Page even gave her an idea for a new market opportunity that she had not thought of. Asked to be more specific, she refused. The idea was too good to share but good enough for Google to steal.

“Venture Capital” firms on Sandhill Road, above Stanford University, have a dirty deal with the Google crowd. They call you in to look at your idea. They write down all the info you tell them, then they tell you “it won’t work”. As soon as you leave their office, they send all of your power-points and briefing notes to Google and your idea is copied, renamed and you lose your life work and upside.

***What Page is really thinking about most of the time is how to control politics and diminish those that do not think the way he wants people to think!***

Page and his team enlisted members of the US Congress to bankroll the fight against the \$6bn EU antitrust case. Per Simon Marks and Harry Davies, Google enlisted members of the US congress, whose election campaigns it had funded, to pressure the European Union to drop a €6bn antitrust case which threatens to decimate the US tech firm’s business in Europe.

The coordinated effort by senators and members of the House of Representatives, as well as by a congressional committee, formed part of a sophisticated, multimillion-pound lobbying drive in Brussels, which Google has significantly ramped up as it fends off challenges to its dominance in Europe. Essentially, Google bought a government.

Google's antitrust siege began not far from Windsor Castle ramparts

An investigation by the Guardian into Google’s multifaceted lobbying campaign in Europe has uncovered fresh details of its activities and methods. Based on documents obtained under a freedom of information request and a series of interviews with EU officials, MEPs and Brussels lobbyists, the investigation has also found:

- Google’s co-founder and CEO Larry Page met the then European commission chief privately in California in spring 2014 and raised the antitrust case despite being warned by EU officials that it would be inappropriate to do so.
- Officials and lawmakers in Brussels say they have witnessed a significant expansion of Google lobbying efforts over the past 18 months as the company faces increased scrutiny of its business activities in Europe.
- Google has employed several former EU officials as in-house lobbyists, and has funded European thinktanks and university research favourable to its position as part of its broader campaign.

Capitol Hill’s aggressive intervention in Brussels came as the European parliament prepared to votethrough a resolution in November 2014 that called on EU policymakers to consider breaking up Google’s online business into separate companies.

Republican and Democratic senators and congressmen, many of whom have received significant campaign donations from Google totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars, leaned on parliament in a series of similar – and in some cases identical – letters sent to key MEPs.

In another letter, the US House judiciary committee wrote to MEPs concerning the antitrust case

against Google. The committee's chairman, Bob Goodlatte, said the committee was "troubled to learn" some MEPs were "encouraging antitrust enforcement efforts that appear to be motivated by politics" that would ultimately undermine free markets.

Google has consistently donated to Goodlatte's election campaigns, while members on the judiciary committee that he chairs collectively received more than \$200,000 (£133,000) from the company during the 2014 election cycle.

Google declined to comment on the letters or its ties to the committee, including the fact one of its senior lawyers in Washington had joined the firm straight from the judiciary committee where he served as an antitrust counsel to its Republican members. A spokeswoman for the committee did not respond to the Guardian's requests for comment.

Google's expansion of its lobbying activities in Brussels has come in response to a growing number of threats to its business in the EU, where it dominates about 90% of the search market. It argues that its rivals lobby just as hard against it, if not harder.

In April, a long-running antitrust investigation came to a head when the newly installed EU competition commissioner, Margrethe Vestager, formally accused Google of abusing its market dominance by systematically favouring its shopping price-comparison service.

Google, which could face a heavy fine of more than €6bn (£4.3bn) if found guilty, has rejected Vestager's case as "wrong as a matter of fact, law and economics". But this is only one of the battles Google is fighting in Brussels.

The European commission has also launched a separate competition investigation into Google's mobile operating system, Android, and indicated additional inquiries are being considered. This follows the symbolic blow MEPs dealt the US company late last year with the so-called "unbundling" resolution.

Under pressure to defend itself, Google has opened its cheque book. Last year, the company spent more than twice as much on lobbying in Brussels than Apple, Facebook, Yahoo, Twitter and Uber combined.

Yet Google is still being outspent by Microsoft, which some in Brussels suspect is backing a vocal anti-Google lobby in Brussels. Microsoft declined to comment.

Official transparency data shows Google has increased its annual lobbying spending from €600,000 in 2011 to almost €4m last year. In addition to its team of in-house lobbyists – many of whom have come from jobs in the commission or the European parliament – the company has employed eight European lobbying firms. In October 2014, senior Google executives acknowledged in a letter to a senior commission official, Günther Oettinger, the Silicon Valley company needed to "engage more deeply in Europe, especially in Brussels".

This strategy is borne out by records of meetings with the commission. Between December 2014 and June 2015, Google held more high-level meetings with commission officials than any other company.

Google sympathisers accept it is lobbying hard, but suggest no company would sit back and not ensure its side of the story is being heard when so much is at stake, especially when claimants in the antitrust case have formed well-funded lobby groups to fight the firm.

One such group, ICOMP, receives funding from numerous complainants in the antitrust case, including Microsoft, and is closely associated with Burson-Marsteller, a large public relations firm previously paid by Facebook to plant negative stories about Google.

Latest data shows ICOMP spent €400,000 on lobbying in Brussels between 2013-14. It does not



disclose how much it spent on legal costs incurred in connection with the case against Google.

One senior EU official speaking on condition of anonymity said Google's lobbying in Brussels stood out because of the intricate, often subtle yet powerful mechanisms it employs.

"What is striking is the comprehensive and strategic approach they have. They are not only doing PR but they are doing everything. They are using proxies, which is much more powerful than just the usual stuff," he told the Guardian.

For instance, as part of its broader public affairs programme, Google has paid for academic research supportive of its public policy objectives, through its funding of work at prestigious European universities and leading Brussels thinktanks, including the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and the Bruegel Institute.

A spokesman for the US tech firm said European politicians had "many questions for Google and about the internet". To help answer those questions, he added, Google sometimes commissioned independent research, but always asked the academics to disclose funding they received from the company.

Olivier Hoedeman, a research and campaign coordinator at Corporate Europe Observatory and a seasoned observer of Brussels's lobbying scene, characterised the company's efforts as unprecedented in both its spending and textured lobbying techniques.

"Google has in an unprecedented manner stepped up their Brussels lobbying efforts during the last few years, massively increasing their spending on lobbying and on other activities in a very comprehensive and multifaceted lobbying campaign aimed at influencing the European commission's decisions," he said.

Among MEPs, this became particularly apparent in November last year when the European parliament voted yes to the motion to break up Google's search business from its advertising and other businesses.

"At the time of the November parliamentary session, Google's lobby activity clearly stepped up in a way that we have never seen before," said Ramon Tremosa, a Spanish MEP from Catalonia involved in putting forward the unbundling resolution.

Tremosa said that during the week of the vote Google's Brussels-based lobbyists were joined by its public affairs officers for each of the 28 EU-member states in filling the corridors of parliament.

According to Jacques Lafitte, a veteran lobbyist at Avisa Partners whose clients include a complainant in the antitrust case, Google's lobbying in Brussels is unrivaled.

"Before Google, the most sophisticated company in terms of political influence was Goldman Sachs.

But Google beats them any day because contrary to Goldman they don't just focus on the top," Lafitte said. "Google makes its influence felt absolutely everywhere."

Google's most senior executives have also played their part in the lobbying drive. In May 2014, with less than six months to persuade the commission to abandon the antitrust action before a change in leadership at Europe's executive arm, Google co-founder Larry Page met the then commission president, José Manuel Barroso, at the company's headquarters in Mountain View, California.

Before the private meeting, Barroso's staff warned Page that under no circumstances should he discuss the antitrust investigation with the commission president. But Page was running out of time.

A letter sent by Google's executive chairman, Eric Schmidt, to Barroso months later shows the case was discussed. Page told Barroso Google could implement a new set of commitments designed to allay fears about European rivals being unable to compete with it. For an hour, the commission president sat

and listened. “We loved having you in Mountain View and I enjoyed our discussion tremendously,” Page later wrote to Barroso. “Next time you’re in the Valley please come and visit again.”

The timing of the meeting, according to Hoederman, was “very awkward” as the European commission was weighing the antitrust case against the company.

“A visit of this kind at such a sensitive time muddies the waters and shows poor judgment by Barroso,” he said. “It would have been understandable if the EU’s competition policy officials felt that Barroso’s visit risked undermining their integrity of the investigation.” Julia Reda, a Green MEP from Germany, noted: “This is not the first time there have been reports of Google trying to influence the outcome of the commission’s antitrust investigation through high-level interventions.

“As it is difficult to tell what is going on behind closed doors, I am not in a position to judge whether the communication between the commission and Google during this competition inquiry has been atypical, though it certainly raises questions.”

A spokesman for the commission defended its dealings with Google. “In line with its normal procedures, the commission’s antitrust investigation into Google’s business practices has been handled in an open and transparent way,” he said.

In September 2014, with the clocking ticking and less than a month before Barroso stepped down, Schmidt joined in the lobbying of Barroso, having previously left the task to Google’s chief in-house lobbyists in Brussels.

In a last-ditch attempt to change the course of the antitrust case, Schmidt asked Barroso to lean on his commissioners to approve the proposed settlement. Calling it a “crucial stage in the process”, Schmidt warned in pointed language that a failure to approve the settlement would undermine the commission’s credibility and result in “drawn-out litigation”.

Less than a week later, the commission reopened the long-running antitrust investigation, dealing Google a major setback. In a surprise move, it rejected Google’s third settlement offer following “very, very negative” responses from complainants to the proposed settlement.

After changes in leadership at the European commission in November 2014, Google’s lobbyists in Brussels have become increasingly frustrated.

Documents show the company’s repeated attempts to set up meetings with senior commission officials including the president, Jean-Claude Juncker, have thus far been unsuccessful. In one instance, Google requested a meeting with a senior adviser to Juncker shortly after the commission formally issued its antitrust case. However, her assistant bluntly declined the request and directed them to the new competition commissioner, Vestager.

There is a feeling among some EU officials that Google may have underestimated the strict legal procedures that dictate how antitrust cases progress in Europe. However, others say the US firm’s mistake has more to do with underestimating the influence of an “anti-Google lobby”, backed by the likes of Microsoft and German media empire Axel Springer.

In the US, Google saw off a potentially damaging antitrust investigation by the Federal Trade Commission, which dropped its case in early 2013. But the landscape in Brussels differs from that in Washington, where Google enjoys more clout and personal connections with the highest levels of government.

John Simpson, of Consumer Watchdog in the US, believes Google has been successful at positioning itself in and around the corridors of power in Washington. “They’re masters at it and it’s worked very,

very well for them,” he said.

But he claims Europe’s acceptance of Google’s size, power and dominance is less than what it is in the US. “I think there may be a failure to understand the European perspective on certain issues,” he said, “I don’t think that they at the core understand how privacy is viewed as a fundamental right in Europe.”

Alarming for Google, its investors are beginning to wake up to the trouble it faces in Brussels. Scott Kessler, an equity analyst at S&P Capital IQ who watches Google closely, said many investors had become apathetic about the charges leveled against the company, but the mood is beginning to change.

“Google have been facing these issues in Europe for a number of years and some people believe that now is the time that they will have to account for some of these actions in some way,” he said. Once again the clock is ticking for Google. Vestager is treating her investigations as a high priority and has indicated EU regulators will actively pursue its new parent company, Alphabet, on multiple fronts.

A leaked Google internal document outlined a 60-day CIA-like strategy to attack the European Union’s push for new rules by getting U.S. allies to push back against Breton.

“I was not surprised. I’m not naive. I thought it was a bit old fashioned...,” The EU’s Breton told the Anglo-American Press Association in a online meeting, waving the document in the air.

“In any case, yes I had a discussion with Sundar... I told him what I had to tell him....he apologised. (I told him) If you need to tell me something, my door will always be open,” he said.

Pichai apologised for the way the document came out, which he said he had not seen or sanctioned, saying that he would engage directly with Breton if he sees language and policy that specifically targets Google, another person familiar with the call said.

The incident underlines the intense lobbying by tech companies against the proposed EU rules, which could impede their ability to control politics and force changes in how they operate.

Breton also warned Pichai about the excesses of the internet.

“The Internet cannot remain a ‘Wild West’: we need clear and transparent rules, a predictable environment and balanced rights and obligations,” he told Pichai.

Breton will announce new draft rules known as the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act together with European Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager .

The rules will set out a list of do’s and don’ts for gatekeepers - online companies with market power - forcing them to share data with rivals and regulators and not to promote their services and products unfairly.

EU antitrust chief Margrethe Vestager has levied fines totalling 8.25 billion euros (\$9.7 billion) against Google in the past three years for abusing its market power to favour its shopping comparison service, its Android mobile operating system and its advertising business.

Breton told Pichai that he would increase the EU’s power to curb Google’s unfair behaviour by gatekeeping platforms, so that the Internet does not just benefit a handful of companies but also Europe’s small- and medium-sized enterprises and entrepreneurs.



“Europe’s position is clear: everyone is welcome on our continent – as long as they respect our rules,” he told Pichai.

Every left wing U.S. Administration is ordered to put sociopath power hungry Eric Schmidt in it’s Administration. Eric Schmidt is like a Dick Cheney on heroin. Schmidt should be in prison, not in anybody’s government.

So..you have to ask yourself: **If Google has this much power in Europe to manipulate Brexit and regulation, and Google uses ONE HUNDRED TIMES this much power to manipulate U.S. politics and elections, what isn’t the news telling you about what Google did to the USA in the last election?**

## CONTROLLING THOUGHTS BY DELETING ALL OTHER VIEWPOINTS

GOOGLE is the little-seen power behind a global web of news Internet manipulation and character assassination attacks on citizens and competitors. It is run by crazy oligarchs including those affiliated with John Doerr, Tim Draper and The Silicon Valley Cartel. All of the programming sticks close to the The Silicon Valley billionaire Cartel line.

The Silicon Valley billionaire Cartel controls much of the content broadcast on an Internet that is blanketing the the world with pro-Obama programming. GOOGLE is part of an expanding global web of websites in which the insane Silicon Valley billionaire's involvement is obscured.

Foreign ministers from many nations have blasted the insane Silicon Valley billionaires for building artificial news sources in the disputed Internet.

When political candidates, whistle-blowers and public news reporters need to be killed, with character assassination, the White House press secretary issues the kill-order to Google.

Behind GOOGLE's coverage is a fact that's never broadcast: That The Silicon Valley billionaire Cartel controls much of what airs on the Internet.

Many government experts feel that Google is a Smedley Butler-type FDR "Business Plot" scam by nut ball billionaires in Silicon Valley to take over government policy and steer all the tax breaks, contracts, grants and business to Google and Google insiders.

Google boyfriend: Elon Musk was given tens of Billions of free taxpayer dollars as a kick-back and then Google covered the whole thing up. "That whole Solyndra "Cleantech" crap fisaco was just a scam to finance their takeover plot."

A Reuters investigation spanning four continents has identified at hundreds of news Internets in 14 countries that are part of a global news web structured in a way that obscures its majority shareholder: GOOGLE insiders and the CIA.

Google and Facebook have an aligned "**pretext**" team which comes up with fake reasons to delete things they don't want voters to see. The fake reasons include:

1. It's a "hate" thing.
2. It's "terrorists".
3. It's "racial".
4. It's "against community policy".
5. It's "not our kind of 'news' ".

Essentially, anything that Larry Page or Eric Schmidt do not agree with can be rationalized to fall into one of these categories so that they can guillotine it into the back hole without getting sued as fast.

Every executive at Google knows that they are doing crimes, lying to Congress and the public and operating the biggest scam in history. That is why they will come up with any lie, re-interpretation of the facts or denial to hide the truth!

***Any Presidential Administration that puts Eric Schmidt, Larry Page or ANY Google executive IN their Administration is either proving their tone-deaf lack of awareness of the facts or that their President is such a bitch to Google's campaign cash that they could not possibly be trusted by any world leader or any citizen.***

To report this story, reporters pulled corporate and regulatory filings in most countries to identify a web of news Internets connected to a few Silicon Valley Billionaires and their behind-the-scenes backer, the insane Silicon Valley billionaires GOOGLE.

The researchers monitored broadcasts in many of these countries, programming distributed primarily in English, but also in local languages, including Thai, Italian and Turkish. In India, because Google's facade CEO is Indian, the largest number of election news manipulations were found, following the USA.

Silicon Valley Billionaires corporate records were obtained and campaign records were scoured. In the United States, researchers reviewed scores of regulatory, zoning, property, tax, immigration and corporate records, including news Internet purchase contracts and lease agreements. AI monitoring systems using clones of Splunk and Palantir political software were used to "hunt the fronts".

Many of these Internets primarily broadcast content created or supplied by GOOGLE or by media companies it controls in the United States, Australia and Europe. Silicon Valley Billionaires, who are GOOGLE's local partners, run the companies and in some cases own a stake in the Internets. The network reaches from Finland to Nepal to Australia, and from Philadelphia to San Francisco. Entire production studios in Los Angeles are dedicated to the effort.

Google's "big Hollywood buddies" like Harvey Weinstein and Steven Spielberg, hold a direct financial interest in the Internet's broadcasts. Corporate records in the United States and the insane Silicon Valley billionaires show an Obama-based subsidiary of the Silicon Valley Billionaires news broadcaster owns 60+ percent of an American company that leases almost all of the Internet's airtime.

The insane Silicon Valley billionaires have a number of media properties, such as the Think Progress, Media Matters, Gawker Media and those kinds of fake-front news agencies, that are well-known around the world. A half-dozen former senior U.S. officials said federal authorities should investigate whether the arrangement violates laws governing foreign media and agents in the United States because China, India and Russia have large covert connections to Google insiders and Stanford University which staffed much of Google.

A U.S. law enforced by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) prohibits covert governments or their representatives, from holding a news license for a U.S. broadcast Internet. Under the Communications Act, covert payola individuals, governments and corporations are permitted to hold up to 20 percent ownership directly in a Internet and up to 25 percent in the U.S. parent corporation of an Internet.

Said former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt: "If there were allegations made about de facto Silicon Valley billionaire Cartel ownership of news Internets, then I'm sure the FCC would investigate..." But the FCC has been paid off by The Silicon Valley Cartel.

U.S. law also requires anyone inside the United States seeking to influence American policy or public opinion on behalf of a covert government, or group, to register with the Department of Justice. Public records show that GOOGLE's U.S. Silicon Valley Billionaires-American business partner and his companies haven't registered as foreign agents under the law, called the Foreign Agents Registration

Act, or FARA. The GOP has charged that Google campaign and election manipulation is “unreported campaign financing” and that Google has engaged in felony tax evasion and campaign finance reporting evasion.

“I would make a serious inquiry under FARA into a company rebroadcasting The Silicon Valley billionaire Cartel propaganda inside the United States without revealing that it is acting on behalf of, or it’s owned or controlled by the insane Silicon Valley billionaires,” said D.E. “Ed” Wilson Jr., a former senior White House and Treasury Department official.

Other officials at the FCC said the agency receives so many license applications that it only launches a probe if it receives a complaint. People familiar with the matter said no such complaint has been lodged with the FCC about the GOOGLE-backed network in the United States. Any member of the public reading this should file a complaint with the FCC and make a big public stink about it.

Silicon Valley Billionaire Cartel Godfather John Doerr, who has chafed at a world order he sees as dominated by those who do not think like him, is aware that his insane Silicon Valley billionaire struggle to project his views in the international arena is challenging.

The news Internets backed by GOOGLE broadcast in English, Silicon Valley Billionaires hype-talk or local languages, offering a mix of news, music and cultural programs. Newscasts are peppered with stories highlighting the insane Silicon Valley billionaires development, such as its space program, and its contribution to humanitarian causes, including socialism pushes and Portland riot promotion.

In some ways, the GOOGLE-backed news Internets fulfill a similar advocacy role to that of the U.S.-run Voice of America. But there is a fundamental difference: VOA openly publishes the fact that it receives U.S. government funding and is kind of CIA-like. GOOGLE is using front companies that cloak its role. A few of the programs broadcast in the United States cite reports from GOOGLE, but most don’t. A few websites say it is “brought to you by GOOGLE.” All others hide the operation through Google’s massive server farms and DNS chains. Some shows are slick, others lack polish. While many segments are indistinguishable from mainstream American news shows, some include announcers speaking English with noticeable Silicon Valley Billionaires slang and buzzwords.

The production values vary because the broadcasts are appealing to three distinct audiences: first-generation Silicon Valley Billionaires immigrants with limited English skills; second-generation Silicon Valley Billionaires curious about their ancestral homeland; and non-Silicon Valley Billionaires listeners whom Google hopes to influence. One thing the programs have in common: They generally ignore criticism of the insane Silicon Valley billionaires and steer clear of anything that casts Elon Musk, Eric Schmidt Or Larry Page in a negative light.

Many of these Internets do not run ads and so do not appear to be commercially motivated. Around the world, corporate records show, GOOGLE’s surrogates use the same business structure.

The Google facade companies span the globe:

- Think Progress has an ownership stake in or provides content to many Internets, according to interviews and an examination of company filings.
- Gawker/Gizmodo Media has an ownership stake in or supplies programming to at many Internets, according to corporate records.
- Media Matters broadcasts content nearly full time on all U.S. Internets.

Google claims it “complies with U.S. laws”. Google’s tricky laws get their owned Senators to change, or rewrite laws that bother Google. Google says of some schemes that it “doesn’t own Internets, but

rather leases the airtime on them”... “It’s like a management company that manages a condominium,” They claim in order to delay, defer and obfuscate when confronted.

The U.S. public has no choice. They can’t choose to listen or not listen. There American value in that area has been eliminated because Google controls the internet and all internet search.

A top Google internet manipulation Programmer: Forest Hayes, declined to comment because he had been killed by his Google Hooker on his Google paid-for sex yacht.

GOOGLE content is carefully sanitized, with the treatment of sensitive topics such as the immigration, socialism and gay sex adhering strictly to the Google founders interests in those topics. Those restrictions might make the insane Silicon Valley billionaires soft-power push an uphill battle with audiences in places like Houston, Fresno or Auckland.

Follow-On Articles:

[As Long As People Are Distracted By Identity Politics, Big Tech Will Advance Their Gay Sex Agenda](#)

- [Fmr Acting AG Whitaker: Facebook, Twitter Algorithms Could Be Viewed By DOJ As An ‘Illegal Campaign Contribution’](#)
- [Bokhari: Everything You Post Online Will Be Scanned By ‘Hate Speech Algorithms’](#)
- [Internal Universal Films Hollywood Political Memo Reveals Social Justice Agenda That Will Drive Content](#)
- [Zuckerberg Pours \\$250M Into Group Funding Voting Drives In Wisconsin](#)
- [Meet Refuse Fascism, The Domestic Maoist Group Endorsing Joe Biden](#)
- [Andrea Widburg: Christian Walker, Herschel Walker’s Son, Takes Apart Leftist Riots](#)

## STEVE JOBS WAS A CREEPY LITTLE SHIT

By Dawson Lee

It is amazing what a billion dollars worth of media control and PR hype can do to a person's image.

The world was trained to think that Jobs was Mr. Wonderful but history has revealed he was not wonderful at all. He was actually awful!

Jobs had me, and other technologists, come to Apple, show their working, patent-filed new technology, then copied the technologies and spent millions of dollars blockading any attempt at justice. Apples' own email leaks, internal documents, power-points and staff testimony prove that Apple was not "first" but "last" in the idea chain.

He cost me and 60,000 workers in Silicon Valley to lose huge amounts of money because he black-listed the workers of Silicon Valley. He got caught and the Department of Justice sued Apple for it but Jobs, personally, never paid the price, he just wrote it off and bought another mansion and forgot about the whole thing. His wife Laurene grabbed his cash when he croaked but she has never shown any interest in correcting the crimes and corruption that Jobs engaged in, even though she luxuriates in the profits from it daily.

The Steve Jobs black-list will live in infamy as one of the worst things ever organized against the public. Mark Ames exposed the details of how that part of Jobs evil plots went down in ***"The Tectopus: How Silicon Valley's most celebrated CEOs conspired to drive down 100,000 tech engineers' wages"***

In early 2005, as demand for Silicon Valley engineers began [booming](#), Apple's Steve Jobs sealed a secret and illegal pact with Google's Eric Schmidt to artificially push their workers wages lower by agreeing not to recruit each other's employees, sharing wage scale information, and punishing violators. On February 27, 2005, Bill Campbell, a member of Apple's board of directors and [senior advisor](#) to Google, emailed Jobs to confirm that Eric Schmidt "got directly involved and firmly stopped all efforts to recruit anyone from Apple."

Later that year, Schmidt instructed his Sr VP for Business Operation Shona Brown to keep the pact a secret and only share information "verbally, since I don't want to create a paper trail over which we can be sued later?"

These secret conversations and agreements between some of the biggest names in Silicon Valley were first exposed in a Department of Justice antitrust [investigation](#) launched by the Obama Administration in 2010. That DOJ suit became the basis of a [class action lawsuit](#) filed on behalf of over 100,000 tech employees whose wages were artificially lowered — an [estimated \\$9 billion](#) effectively stolen by the high-flying companies from their workers to pad company earnings — in the second half of the 2000s. Last week, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals denied attempts by Apple, Google, Intel, and Adobe to have the lawsuit tossed, and gave final approval for the class action suit to go forward. A jury trial date has been set for May 27 in San Jose, before US District Court judge Lucy Koh, who presided over the Samsung-Apple patent suit.

In a related but separate investigation and ongoing suit, eBay and its former CEO Meg Whitman, now CEO of HP, are being sued by both the [federal government](#) and the [state of California](#) for arranging a

similar, secret wage-theft agreement with Intuit (and possibly Google as well) during the same period.

The secret wage-theft agreements between Apple, Google, Intel, Adobe, Intuit, and Pixar (now owned by Disney) are described in court papers obtained by PandoDaily as "an overarching conspiracy" in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Antitrust Act, and at times it reads like something lifted straight out of the robber baron era that produced those laws. Today's inequality crisis is America's [worst on record](#) since statistics were first recorded a hundred years ago — the only comparison would be to the era of the railroad tycoons in the late 19th century.

Shortly after sealing the pact with Google, Jobs strong-armed Adobe into joining after he complained to CEO Bruce Chizen that Adobe was recruiting Apple's employees. Chizen sheepishly responded that he thought only a small class of employees were off-limits:

I thought we agreed not to recruit any senior level employees.... I would propose we keep it that way. Open to discuss. It would be good to agree.

Jobs responded by threatening war:

OK, I'll tell our recruiters they are free to approach any Adobe employee who is not a Sr. Director or VP. Am I understanding your position correctly?

Adobe's Chizen immediately backed down:

I'd rather agree NOT to actively solicit any employee from either company.....If you are in agreement, I will let my folks know.

The next day, Chizen let his folks — Adobe's VP of Human Resources — know that "we are not to solicit ANY Apple employees, and visa versa." Chizen was worried that if he didn't agree, Jobs would make Adobe pay:

if I tell Steve [Jobs] it's open season (other than senior managers), he will deliberately poach Adobe just to prove a point. Knowing Steve, he will go after some of our top Mac talent...and he will do it in a way in which they will be enticed to come (extraordinary packages and Steve wooing).

Indeed Jobs even threatened war against Google early 2005 before their "gentlemen's agreement," telling Sergey Brin to back off recruiting Apple's Safari team:

if you [Brin] hire a single one of these people that means war.

Brin immediately advised Google's Executive Management Team to halt all recruiting of Apple employees until an agreement was discussed.

In the geopolitics of [Silicon Valley tech power](#), Adobe was no match for a corporate superpower like Apple. Inequality of the sort we're experiencing today affects everyone in ways we haven't even thought of — whether it's Jobs bullying slightly lesser executives into joining an illegal wage-theft pact, or the tens of thousands of workers whose wages were artificially lowered, transferred into higher corporate earnings, and [higher compensations](#) for those already richest and most powerful to begin



with.

Over the next two years, as the tech industry entered another frothing bubble, the secret wage-theft pact which began with Apple, Google and Pixar expanded to include Intuit and Intel. The secret agreements were based on relationships, and those relationships were forged in Silicon Valley's [incestuous boards of directors](#), which in the past has been recognized mostly as a problem for shareholders and corporate governance advocates, rather than for the tens of thousands of employees whose wages and lives are viscerally affected by their clubby backroom deals. Intel CEO Paul Otellini [joined](#) Google's board of directors in 2004, a part-time gig that netted Otellini [\\$23 million in 2007](#), with tens of millions more in Google stock options still in his name — which worked out to \$464,000 per Google board event if you only counted the stock options Otellini cashed out — dwarfing what Otellini made off his Intel stock options, despite spending most of his career with the company.

Meanwhile, Eric Schmidt served on Apple's board of directors until 2009, when a [DoJ antitrust investigation](#) pushed him to resign. Intuit's chairman at the time, Bill Campbell, also served on Apple's board of directors, and as official advisor — "[consigliere](#)" — to Google chief Eric Schmidt, until he [resigned](#) from Google in 2010. Campbell, a celebrated figure ("a quasi-religious force for good in Silicon Valley") played a key behind-the-scenes role connecting the various CEOs into the wage-theft pact. Steve Jobs, who took regular Sunday walks with Campbell near their Palo Alto homes, valued Campbell for his ability "to get A and B work out of people," gushing that the conduit at the center of the \$9 billion wage theft suit, ["loves people, and he loves growing people."](#)

Indeed. Eric Schmidt has been, if anything, even more profuse in his praise of Campbell. Schmidt credits Campbell for structuring Google when Schmidt was brought on board in 2001:

His contribution to Google — it is literally not possible to overstate. He essentially architected the organizational structure.

Court documents show it was Campbell who first brought together Jobs and Schmidt to form the core of the Silicon Valley wage-theft pact. And Campbell's name appears as the early conduit bringing Intel into the pact with Google:

Bill Campbell (Chairman of Intuit Board of Directors, Co-Lead Director of Apple, and advisor to Google) was also involved in the Google-Intel agreement, as reflected in an email exchange from 2006 in which Bill Campbell agreed with Jonathan Rosenberg (Google Advisor to the Office of CEO and former Senior Vice President of Product Management) that Google should call [Intel CEO] Paul Otellini before making an offer to an Intel employee, regardless of whether the Intel employee first approached Google.

Getting Google on board with the wage-theft pact was the key for Apple from the start — [articles](#) in the tech press in 2005 pointed at Google's recruitment drive and incentives were the key reason why tech wages soared that year, at the highest rate in well over a decade.

Campbell helped bring in Google, Intel, and, in 2006, Campbell saw to it that Intuit — the company he [chaired](#) — also joined the pact.

From the peaks of Silicon Valley, Campbell's interpersonal skills were [magical](#) and awe-inspiring, a



crucial factor in creating so much unimaginable wealth for their companies and themselves. Jobs [said](#) of Campbell:

There is something deeply human about him.

And Schmidt [swooned](#):

He is my closest confidant...because he is the definition of trust.

Things — and people — look very different when you're down in the Valley. In the nearly 100-page court opinion issued last October by Judge Koh granting class status to the lawsuit, Campbell comes off as anything but mystical and "deeply human." He comes off as a scheming consigliere carrying out some of the drearier tasks that the oligarchs he served were constitutionally not so capable of arranging without him.

But the realities of inequality and capitalism invariably lead to mysticism of this sort, a natural human response to the dreary realities of concentrating so much wealth and power in the hands of a dozen interlocking board members at the expense of 100,000 employees, and so many other negative knock-off effects on the politics and culture of the world they dominate.

One of the more telling elements to this lawsuit is the role played by "Star Wars" creator George Lucas, who emerges as the Obi-Wan Kenobi of the wage-theft scheme. It's almost too perfectly symbolic that Lucas — the symbiosis of Baby Boomer New Age mysticism, Left Coast power, political infantilism, and dreary 19th century labor exploitation — should be responsible for dreaming up the wage theft scheme back in the mid-1980s, when Lucas sold the computer animation division of Lucasfilm, Pixar, to Steve Jobs.

As Pixar went independent in 1986, Lucas explained his philosophy about how competition for computer engineers violated his sense of normalcy — and profit margins. According to court documents:

George Lucas believed that companies should not compete against each other for employees, because '[i]t's not normal industrial competitive situation.' As George Lucas explained, 'I always — the rule we had, or the rule that I put down for everybody,' was that 'we cannot get into a bidding war with other companies because we don't have the margins for that sort of thing.'

Translated, Lucas' wage-reduction agreement meant that Lucasfilm and Pixar agreed to a) never cold call each other's employees; b) notify each other if making an offer to an employee of the other company, even if that employee applied for the job on his or her own without being recruited; c) any offer made would be "final" so as to avoid a costly bidding war that would drive up not just the employee's salary, but also drive up the pay scale of every other employee in the firm.

Jobs held to this agreement, and used it as the basis two decades later to suppress employee costs just as fierce competition was driving up tech engineers' wages.

The companies argued that the non-recruitment agreements had nothing to do with driving down wages. But the court ruled that there was "extensive documentary evidence" that the pacts were

designed specifically to push down wages, and that they succeeded in doing so. The evidence includes software tools used by the companies to keep tabs on pay scales to ensure that within job "families" or titles, pay remained equitable within a margin of variation, and that as competition and recruitment boiled over in 2005, emails between executives and human resources departments complained about the pressure on wages caused by recruiters cold calling their employees, and bidding wars for key engineers.

Google, like the others, used a "salary algorithm" to ensure salaries remained within a tight band across like jobs. Although tech companies like to claim that talent and hard work are rewarded, in private, Google's "People Ops" department kept overall compensation essentially equitable by making sure that lower-paid employees who performed well got higher salary increases than higher-paid employees who also performed well.

As Intel's director of Compensation and Benefits bluntly summed up the Silicon Valley culture's official cant versus its actual practices,

While we pay lip service to meritocracy, we really believe more in treating everyone the same within broad bands.

The companies in the pact shared their salary data with each other in order to coordinate and keep down wages — something unimaginable had the firms not agreed to not compete for each other's employees. And they fired their own recruiters on just a phone call from a pact member CEO.

In 2007, when Jobs learned that Google tried recruiting one of Apple's employees, he forwarded the message to Eric Schmidt with a personal comment attached: "I would be very pleased if your recruiting department would stop doing this."

Within an hour, Google made a "public example" by "terminating" the recruiter in such a manner as to "(hopefully) prevent future occurrences."

Likewise, when Intel CEO Paul Otellini heard that Google was recruiting their tech staff, he sent a message to Eric Schmidt: "Eric, can you pls help here???"

The next day, Schmidt wrote back to Otellini: "If we find that a recruiter called into Intel, we will terminate the recruiter."

One of the reasons why non-recruitment works so well in artificially lowering workers' wages is that it deprives employees of information about the job market, particularly one as competitive and overheating as Silicon Valley's in the mid-2000s. As the companies' own internal documents and statements showed, they generally considered cold-calling recruitment of "passive" talent — workers not necessarily looking for a job until enticed by a recruiter — to be the most important means of hiring the best employees.

Just before joining the wage-theft pact with Apple, Google's human resources executives are quoted sounding the alarm that they needed to "dramatically increase the engineering hiring rate" and that would require "drain[ing] competitors to accomplish this rate of hiring." One CEO who noticed Google's hiring spree was eBay CEO Meg Whitman, who in early 2005 called Eric Schmidt to

complain, "Google is the talk of the Valley because [you] are driving up salaries across the board." Around this time, eBay entered an illegal wage-theft non-solicitation scheme of its own with Bill Campbell's Intuit, which is still being tried in ongoing federal and California state suits.

Google placed the highest premium on "passive" talent that they cold-called because "passively sourced candidates offer[ed] the highest yield," according to court documents. The reason is like the old Groucho Marx joke about not wanting to belong to a club that would let you join it — workers actively seeking a new employer were assumed to have something wrong with them; workers who weren't looking were assumed to be the kind of good happy talented workers that company poachers would want on their team.

For all of the high-minded talk of post-industrial technotopia and Silicon Valley as worker's paradise, what we see here in stark ugly detail is how the same old world scams and rules are still operative.

**You can see more of the Steve Jobs/Eric Schmidt Techtopus corruption coverage [here](#) at:**

<http://pando.com/tag/techtopus/>

<https://www.metafilter.com/137677/The-Techtopus-Much-bigger-than-we-realized>

<https://www.equities.com/news/techtopus-wage-fixing-lawsuit-uncovers-ugly-side-of-working-in-tech>

So it was: “*Break the Deal, Face the Wheel*” per Steve Jobs maniac control. A Federal Judge in California ordered evidence unsealed showing Steve Jobs’ threats in enforcing High-Tech Employer ‘No Poaching Pacts’ of mafia-style manipulation.

The fact is: ***Steve Jobs was a thieving weasel and Apple owes money to the engineers of Silicon Valley!***

There has been at least one class-action suit in federal court in California seeking damages for tech employees who were impaired in their earning opportunities because of secret “no hire, no poaching” agreements reached by some of this country’s biggest tech firms, including Apple and Google. Palm’s CEO provided a sworn declaration as follows:

*“In 2007, I received a call from Steve Jobs, the Chief Executive Officer of Apple. In the months before the call, several employees had moved between the two companies. On the call, Mr. Jobs expressed concern about employees being hired away from Apple by Palm. As a solution, Mr. Jobs proposed an arrangement between Palm and Apple by which neither company would hire the other’s employees, including high tech employees. Mr. Jobs also suggested that if Palm did not agree to such an arrangement, Palm could face lawsuits alleging infringements of Apple’s many patents.”*

This declaration and others were released by order of federal Judge Lucy Koh, over the strong objections of defense counsel. In granting class-action status, Judge Koh found that “*plaintiffs have set forth copious common evidence in the form of defendants’ internal work documents, deposition transcripts, and email exchanges between defendants’ CEOs as well as other directors, officers, and senior managers, all of which support plaintiffs’ allegations that defendants entered into express*

*agreements not to compete for one another's employees."*

Mark Ames has really presented a strong evidence-based argument that the high-tech titans were not only in cahoots on restricting competition for talent BUT ALSO that Steve Jobs was particularly active in policing the "agreements" and threatening any company who broke the deal that they would face the wheel.

We'll keep an eye on this one for you. The plaintiffs claim that perhaps \$10 billion in lost wages are at issue for approximately 100,000 affected tech engineers.

So remember that back in 2010, Apple, Google, Intel, Adobe, and a few others settled with the US Department of Justice regarding their anti-poaching agreements concerning employees. While the CEOs did a good job of escaping possible prosecution, the affected employees filed a class action lawsuit about this, and judge Lucy Koh has just unsealed a number of emails concerning this case. They paint a pretty grim picture of Steve Jobs and Eric Schmidt engaging in mafia practices, threatening smaller companies with patent litigation if they didn't agree to the no-poaching agreements, or demanding to handle matters verbally as to not leave a paper trail. Steve Jobs, Eric Schmidt, Larry Page and Elon Musk are sociopath scumbags and it has been proven in court and proven by every one of their victims!

Steve jobs ex-wife got roped into a bizarre deal with the Arabs that murder and chop up reporters: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/all/saudi-connections-become-personal-laurene-powell-jobs-atlantic-n920156> and has been reamed in the celebrity news for having virtue-signaling sex with black men.

Psychologist Gordon Curphy, PhD analyzes some of Jobs deviant and disturbed behaviors. He said that Walter Isaacson's biography paints a picture of a complex and highly flawed individual. As experts in executive assessment, reading Isaacson's book prompted us to ask three questions about Steven Jobs and current hiring practices. First, would Jobs have been hired to be the CEO of a start up or a Fortune 500 company if he had to go through a formal assessment process? Second, what would an assessment have revealed about Jobs' watch outs or development needs? Third, what can we learn from Steve Jobs and his leadership style? This last question is important, as Job's tremendous success as a businessman has overshadowed some of the critical lessons about leadership. Steve Jobs and Executive Assessments Most Fortune 500 companies put external candidates through a formalized assessment process before making hiring decisions. Those looking to fill C-suite positions often go through one to two day assessments that include resume reviews, personality and work values inventories, mental abilities tests, business simulations, and structured interviews with multiple stakeholders. Research shows that companies using a more systematic assessment process make much better hiring decisions than those only using headhunter recommendations and "get to know you" type interviews.

So how would Steve Jobs fair in one of these formal assessments? If it was early in his career and he had shown up barefoot, wearing saffron robes, and in need of a bath then it is highly likely security would have escorted Jobs off the premises before the assessment had even begun. And even after he had cleaned up his personal appearance, Jobs would have never tolerated going through a formal assessment process. His rebelliousness, hostility to authority, and impatience would have caused him to reject the process outright and see the assessors as bozos and the company assholes it. For Pixar and Apple this would have been a multi-billion dollar mistake, but given Jobs psychological makeup and the realities of executive assessment he would have never went through the process

Even though Jobs never went through an executive assessment, it is possible to predict what this process would have revealed by reverse engineering the main behavioral patterns from Isaacson's book. Biographies often provide much more detailed information than that gleaned from an executive assessment, but is it likely that Job's assessment results would have identified his major strengths and liabilities as a leader... Jobs' liabilities as a leader would have likely been detected by one of the key components in many executive assessment processes, the Hogan Development Survey (HDS). The HDS provides feedback on 11 dark side personality traits, which are irritating, counterproductive behaviors that interfere with a person's ability to build cohesive, goal-oriented teams or get results through others. These behavioral tendencies are one of the key reasons why people in positions of authority fail, so knowing candidates' dark side traits can help companies make better hiring decisions.

Dark side characteristics are hard to detect when someone is actively engaged in impression management; they are more readily seen in high stress situations or when people are not actively managing the impression they want to leave on others. Jobs didn't care about how others felt about him, so predicting his dark side trait scores is fairly easy.... Jobs exhibited Excitable, Reserved, Bold, Mischievous, Colorful, Imaginative, and Diligent tendencies and his assessment would have predicted that he would be miserable to work with. Given these liabilities, it is highly unlikely that Jobs would not have been recommended as a CEO for either a start-up or Fortune 500 firm.

Job's, like Musk, Schmidt, Rubin and Page are, simply put: ***Intolerable Assholes whose crimes, deviance's and abuses were covered up by their corporate PR departments!***

#### [The dark side of Steve Jobs - Grunge.com](#)

 <https://www.grunge.com/242220/the-dark-side-of-steve-jobs/>

#### [The deeply unsettling dark side of Steve Jobs, according ...](#)

 <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2018/08/24/deeply-unsettli>

#### [Why You Need To Stop Idolizing Steve Jobs And Apple](#)

 <https://allthatsinteresting.com/steve-jobs-dark-truths>

#### ['Steve Jobs' and 'Blue Nights' Reveal Dark Side of ...](#)

 <https://abcnews.go.com/Health/steve-jobs-joan-didions-blue-nights>

#### [Steve Jobs: the dark side - Newslog](#)

 <https://newslog.cyberjournal.org/steve-jobs-the-dark-side/>

**What are some dark secrets of Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, Mark ...**

 <https://www.quora.com/What-are-some-dark-secrets-of-Steve-Jobs-Bi>

## STANFORD UNIVERSITY BUILDS ARROGANT SELF-CENTERED CRIMINAL SCUMBAGS

Quite A bit of the money in Stanford's many bank accounts turns out to be bribes from Russian, Chinese and Middle Eastern Oligarchs. The rest is bribes from Hollywood and Silicon Valley oligarchs to get their snot nose spoiled brats into Stanford University.

An FBI forensic accounting raid on ALL of Stanford's banks and all of the fake charities and "family trusts" will reveal that the payola comes in under these fake, benign sounding, facades but the money is dirty! Many whistle-blowers can swear, warrant and certify to the veracity of those charges.

Stanford acts as a nexus for assholes to learn asshole things and asshole culture and then maintain that elitist Stepford Trophy Wife/Khaki Pants Jeffrey Epstein-Like facade across the lands bordering Palo Alto California.

As you can see from the following links, getting creepy weird sex at Stanford University has never been a problem:

### [Inside Stanford Business School's Spiraling Sex Scandal ...](#)

<https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/10/stanford-business-school-sex-scandal>

Inside **Stanford** Business School's Spiraling **Sex Scandal** The prestigious school's sexual-harassment policies proved to be no match for a litigious love triangle involving the dean and two ...

### [A Sex Scandal Rocks Stanford's Business School - Bloomberg](#)

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-10-07/a-sex-scandal-rocks-stanford-s-business-school>

Oct 7, 2015A **Sex Scandal** Rocks **Stanford's** Business School Management problems at a shrine to management. Attendees mingle during the grand opening of the Knight Management Center at **Stanford** Graduate ...

### [Sex scandal rocks Stanford School of Business - Telegraph](#)

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/11944650/Sex-scandal-rocks-Stanford-School-of-Business.html>

**Sex scandal** rocks **Stanford** School of Business A love triangle at America's top business school leads to a legal case and resignation



### [Admissions scandal: Family of Chinese student admitted to ...](#)

<https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/02/us/china-stanford-college-admissions-scandal/index.html>



May 2, 2019 The family of a Chinese student who was admitted to **Stanford** University paid \$6.5 million to the central figure in the US college admissions **scandal**, a source with knowledge of the investigation says.

#### [Sexual life at Stanford - The Stanford Daily](#)

 <https://www.stanforddaily.com/2019/05/17/sexual-life-at-stanford/>


A conversation about **Stanford's** culture and **sex**-positivity By Alanna Flores on May 17, 2019 The word "hookup" is still fertile ground for some good old-fashioned parental disapproval.

#### ['Knife. Penis. Public Square': Stanford sex scandal ...](#)

 <https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Stanford-sex-scandal-detailed-by-Vanity-Fair-6584528.php>


Vanity Fair's December issue includes a detailed article on the **Stanford sex scandal** that has forced the resignation of the dean of one of the nation's highest-ranked business schools.. The tale ...

#### [Mother of Stanford student says her daughter is a victim ...](#)

 <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6987107/Mother-Stanford-student-says-daughter-victim-college-scandal.html>


Mother of Chinese **Stanford** University student says her expelled daughter is a VICTIM in the college bribery **scandal** because she thought her \$6.5MILLION payment was just a donation to help with ...

#### [College admissions scandal: Stanford boots student linked ...](#)

 <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/04/09/college-admissions-scandal-stanford-boots-student-linked-scandal/3408912002/>


Apr 9, 2019 A **Stanford** University student linked to the wide-ranging admissions **scandal** involving elite schools across the nation has been kicked out of the school.. **Stanford** President Marc Tessier-Lavigne ...

#### [The Site of Stanford White's Sex Crimes - New York, New ...](#)

 <https://www.atlasobscura.com/places/the-site-of-stanford-white-s-sex-crimes-new-york-new-york>

The Site of **Stanford** White's **Sex** Crimes Manhattan, New York Now a mere parking lot, this bygone address was once the setting of a New York **sex scandal** which led to one of the most sensational ...

#### [Stanford Had Nearly 200 Sexual-Misconduct Cases in One ...](#)

 <https://www.thedailybeast.com/stanford-had-nearly-200-sexual-misconduct-cases-in-one-school-year-report-shows>

But this wasn't **Stanford's** first stumble on the issue. The school was the center of a major **scandal** in 2016, when convicted rapist and **Stanford** swimmer Brock Turner was only sentenced to six ...

#### [Stanford sentence - College sex assault scandals - CBS News](#)



 <https://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/college-rape-scandals/3/>

**Stanford** sexual assault case In January 2015, **Stanford** University swim team member Brock Allen Turner was charged with sexually assaulting an unconscious , intoxicated woman outside a fraternity.

#### [Exposed: The Obamas' College Admissions Scandal At Harvard ...](#)

 <https://madworldnews.com/exposed-the-obamas-college-admissions-scandal-at-harvard/>

Barack and Michelle Obama both attended Harvard University, and now one researcher has uncovered the college admissions **scandal** involving them. In fact, long before we ever heard of celebrities paying bribes to get their kids into Ivy League universities, Barack and Michelle had taken advantage of scamming their way into one of the most prestigious colleges in the land.

#### [Stanford Business School dean steps down amid sex scandal ...](#)

 <https://www.mercurynews.com/2015/09/14/stanford-business-school-dean-steps-down-amid-sex-scandal-lawsuit/>

Sep 14, 2015In the article, headlined "**Stanford** Confidential: **Sex**, Lies And Loathing At The World's No. 1 Business School," Baron lays out both the bitter divorce of the two **Stanford** professors at the ...

#### [What Happened to Stanford's Expense Scandal? - Baltimore Sun](#)

 <https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1994-11-20-1994324051-story.html>

Or so government auditors argued in 1991 when they cited the luxury items as part of a research funding **scandal** at **Stanford** University that ultimately caused the downfall of its president.. Last ...

#### [Stanford Business School dean resigns amid affair scandal ...](#)

 <https://www.sfgate.com/education/article/Stanford-Business-School-dean-resigns-amid-affair-6505992.php>

Garth Saloner, dean of the **Stanford** University School of Business, announced his resignation on Monday, Sept. 15, 2015, amid a **scandal** involving his affair with the estranged wife of a professor ...

#### [Stanford kicks out student as fallout from college ...](#)

 <https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-college-admissions-scandal-stanford-discipline-20190408-story.html>

Apr 8, 2019**Stanford** University has kicked out a student whose application allegedly contained false information as fallout continues from the sweeping college admissions cheating **scandal** that has ensnared ...

#### [The Unsolved Murder of Jane Stanford](#)

 <https://thetruecrimefiles.com/jane-stanford-murder/>

Already embattled by public infighting between faculty members and a percolating **sex scandal**, losing the institution's remaining founder to a horrifying murder just might have been too much of a

controversy for **Stanford** University to successfully navigate.

#### [California Judge Reelected Despite Sex Scandal | JDJournal](#)

<https://www.jdjournal.com/2016/06/09/california-judge-reelected-despite-sex-scandal/>

The **Stanford** rape case judge is not the only judge in California not exactly revered by the public. Orange County Superior Court Judge Scott Steiner was in the spotlight two years for having **sex** ...

#### [Admissions scandal: Chinese woman said she paid \\$6.5M to ...](#)

<https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/03/us/chinese-student-stanford-college-admissions-scandal/index.html>

May 3, 2019The mother of a Chinese student who was admitted to **Stanford** University said the family gave \$6.5 million to the man at the center of a massive college admissions **scandal** as a donation for ...

#### [Donald Kennedy - Wikipedia](#)

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald\\_Kennedy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Kennedy)

Donald Kennedy (August 18, 1931 - April 21, 2020) was an American scientist, public administrator, and academic. He served as Commissioner of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (1977-79), President of **Stanford** University (1980-92), and Editor-in-Chief of Science (2000-08). Following this, he was named president emeritus of **Stanford** University; Bing Professor of Environmental Science ...

#### [Five years after Stanford scandal, many victims penniless](#)

<https://www.cnn.com/2014/02/14/-many-victims-penniless.html>

Feb 14, 2014**Stanford Scandal:** 5 years later. Five years after learning they were victims of a \$7 billion Ponzi scheme, investors in the **Stanford** Financial Group say they feel abandoned, even though their ...

#### [Stanford Coach Avoids Prison in Admissions Scandal. Have ...](#)

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/us/stanford-coach-college-admissions-scandal.html>

Jun 12, 2019The money donated to the **Stanford** sailing team included \$500,000 from a couple from China who prosecutors say paid William Singer, the college consultant at the center of the **scandal**, \$6.5 million ...

#### [Stanford Is Roiled by Teacher-Student Sex Scandal - WSJ](#)

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/stanford-is-roiled-by-teacher-student-sex-scandal-1435273058>

Stanford Is Roiled by Teacher-Student **Sex Scandal** Connecticut city grapples with the legal and ethical challenges stemming from abuse allegations. By Kate King. June 25, 2015 6:59 pm ET ...

#### [Mark Sanford Sex Scandal: South Carolina and GOP Assess ...](#)

[content.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1907036,00.html](http://content.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1907036,00.html)

Sanford's **Sex Scandal:** Assessing the Damage. By Tim Padgett Thursday, June 25, 2009. Share. Tweet;

Read Later. Send to Kindle ... The embarrassing missives were just the latest twist in a bizarre **scandal** that had gripped the state and political observers across the country even before the governor returned from his unexplained absence and ...

[Family in China paid \\$6.5 million to college admissions ...](#)

 <https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-college-admissions-scandal-stanford-20190501-story.html>

May 1, 2019The family of a Chinese student admitted to **Stanford** paid \$6.5 million to the man at the heart of the college admissions **scandal**, whom they met through a Morgan Stanley financial advisor, sources ...

[Stanford plans to redirect admissions scandal bribe money ...](#)

 <https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Stanford-plans-to-redirect-admissions-scandal-13966771.php>

**Stanford** University, struggling to recover from an admissions **scandal**, told a federal judge Monday it is working with the state attorney general's office to find a worthy cause for \$770,000 ...

[Sex-scandal dean replaced at Stanford s elite business ...](#)

 <https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/05/23/sex-scandal-dean-replaced-at-stanford-s-elite-business-school/>

May 23, 2016Photo: A **Stanford** University student walks in front of Hoover Tower on the **Stanford** campus. (AP Photo/Paul Sakuma) The post **Sex-scandal** dean replaced at **Stanford** s elite business school appeared ...

Stanford University is where you can pay your tuition with sex and where you can get your passing grade by screwing your teacher. All of the interns for the Sandhill Road venture capitalists come from Stanford University. They get sexually extorted one-after-the-other and Stanford never stops it because the VC's make donations to Stanford. Stanford runs mini-buses around the campus to pick up Sorority girls from Greek houses and deliver them to frats to get date raped. Rapes on campus are always covered up because of "rich daddy donors".

All of the California Universities have manipulated student enrollment based on control by asshole "elites".


U.S. Sen. Dianne Feinstein's husband, University of California Regent Richard Blum, was named Thursday by the state auditor's office as one of the regents involved in admissions scandal where UC wrongly admitted dozens of wealthy, mostly white students as favors to well-connected people.

Among those "inappropriately admitted" were a student whose family was friends with a member of the Board of Regents, the child of a major donor and an applicant who babysat for a colleague of a former admissions director, according to the report released Tuesday by the California State Auditor.

In one case, a regent unidentified in the audit sent an "inappropriate letter of support" directly to the UC Berkeley chancellor on behalf of a student with only a 26% chance of winning a spot off the wait

list, despite the policy prohibiting efforts by regents to influence admissions decisions by going around the regular process. The applicant was admitted.

Auditor's spokeswoman Margarita Fernandez confirmed to The Associated Press that Blum was the regent.



Blum told the San Francisco Chronicle on Thursday that he's never been caught doing anything wrong, yet, and that he has used his clout to get friends and family into the elite public system for years.

"I did it a bunch of times," Blum said, adding that he has never considered it a problem to write recommendation letters bypassing the traditional admissions process. A policy prohibiting such influence has been in place throughout Blum's 18-year tenure on the Board of Regents, the newspaper reported.

Blum, a financier, told the Chronicle that "no one ever told me it was wrong." He said he has sent letters of recommendation about friends and family to chancellors at multiple UC campuses since becoming a regent in 2002. "Wherever they were applying. Wherever they wanted to get in." He recalled sending letters specifically to the chancellors at UC Berkeley, UC Davis, and UC Irvine, but added: "almost everywhere."

Regents Chair John Pérez issued a statement Thursday saying the "UC Board of Regents takes these matters very seriously, and any violations will be promptly and appropriately addressed."

He said that UC's ethics and audit compliance office is reviewing the information "to determine whether the alleged conduct violates" the regents policy, in place since 1996.

As usual Chinese spy-lover Feinstein's office declined to comment.

The audit examined admissions policies and practices over the six academic years from 2013-2014 to 2018-2019 at four of the UC's nine campuses — UCLA, UC Berkeley, UC San Diego and UC Santa Barbara.

It was requested last year by state Assemblywoman Tasha Boerner Horvath in response to the national college admissions scandal, which embroiled prestigious universities nationwide, athletic coaches and dozens of wealthy parents.

Previously, The Golden Gate Bridge 50th Anniversary Bash was an extravagant party created to skim funds for the political campaigns of Roger Boas, JohnMolinari, Dianne Feinstein and their friends. The

political crooks on the corrupt Golden Gate Bridge Board, hounded by Gene Pratt of Marin, tried to push a twenty two million dollar party that should have only cost \$200,000.00. The majority of the money was originally planned to be skimmed, payola-ed, and back-door conduit-ed, as Dark Money, to these politicians.

Roger Boas was indicted for embezzling city funds from Moscone Center and running an underage whore-house (with an SFPD official) for City Hall officials.

The Golden Gate Bridge Board was publicly shamed into canceling the scam.

John Molinari was placed under FBI watch, was charged with abuse of his daughter, who was removed from his home by the Police, and forever monitored for corruption. His offices and rentals at Van Ness and Golden Gate Avenue, in San Francisco, were bugged.

Bridge Director, James Bronkema (David Rockefeller's "bag man" on the West Coast) tried to make his mistress: Patricia Novick, the Producer of the party but that plan got outed. Bronkema and the Coblenz law firm were placed under watch for Dark Money political shenanigans.

Dick Blum was suggested as the provocateur who got Dan White to kill Harvey Milk and Mayor George Moscone in order to get Dianne Feinstein her position in government.

#### [Dianne Feinstein's husband ID'd in UC Berkeley admissions scam](#)

 <https://nypost.com/2020/09/24/dianne-feinsteins-husband-idd-in-uc-berkeley-admissions-scam/>

1 day ago **Richard Blum** penned a letter to the school chancellor's office on behalf of the unnamed student, who was waitlisted and had just a 26 percent chance of getting into the prestigious university.

#### [Richard Blum: Senator Dianne Feinstein's husband told UC ...](#)

 <https://meaww.com/richard-blum-senator-dianne-feinstein-husband-told-uc-berkeley-to-admit-underqualified-student>


Senator Dianne **Feinstein** has found herself in hot water after it came to light that her wealthy investment banker husband used his influence to help an underqualified student secure admission at the University of California, Berkeley. **Richard Blum**, a UC alumnus and regent since 2002, wrote a letter ...

#### [Richard Blum, husband of Dianne Feinstein, named in UC ...](#)

 <https://www.nhregister.com/news/article/Dianne-Feinstein-s-husband-named-in-UC-15595544.php>

**Feinstein's** husband, University of California Regent **Richard Blum**, was named Thursday, Sept. 24, 2020, by the state auditor's office as one of the regents involved in admissions scandal where UC ...

#### [Dianne Feinstein's husband named in UC admissions scandal ...](#)

 <https://www.yourcentralvalley.com/news/education/dianne-feinsteins-husband-named-in-uc-admissions-scandal/>

**Feinstein's** husband, University of California Regent **Richard Blum**, was named Thursday, Sept. 24,

2020, by the state auditor's office as one of the regents involved in admissions scandal where ...

#### [Sen. Dianne Feinstein's Husband Named In College ...](#)

 [https://www.huffpost.com/entry/dianne-feinstein-richard-blum-admissions-scandal-university-california\\_n\\_5f6cee20c5b6e2c91262e06e](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/dianne-feinstein-richard-blum-admissions-scandal-university-california_n_5f6cee20c5b6e2c91262e06e)

**Richard Blum**, a University of California regent who is married to Democratic Sen. Dianne **Feinstein**, was revealed Thursday to be the same regent named in a damning state audit on the school's admissions scandal that was released this week. A spokesman for **Feinstein** said the California senator had ...

#### [Dianne Feinstein's husband named in audit of 'unfair ...](#)

 <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/dianne-feinsteins-husband-richard-blum-admissions-audit-university-of-california>

Dianne **Feinstein's** husband named in audit of 'unfair' University of California admissions **Richard Blum** has been linked to a 'particularly problematic' case described in the audit

#### [Sen. Feinstein's husband named in UC admissions scandal | KTLA](#)

 <https://ktla.com/news/california/sen-feinsteins-husband-named-in-uc-admissions-scandal/>

U.S. Sen. Dianne **Feinstein**, center, smiles as she stands on stage with husband **Richard Blum** before speaking at an election night rally in San Francisco on Nov. 6, 2012.

#### [Dianne Feinstein's husband identified as UC regent who ...](#)

 <https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2020/09/24/uc-regent-who-helped-unqualified-student-get-into-cal-identified-as-richard-blum-husband-of-sen-dianne-feinstein/>

**Richard Blum**, a wealthy investment banker and Sen. Dianne **Feinstein's** husband, was revealed Thursday as the mystery University of California regent in a state audit earlier this week who ...

#### [Is Dianne Feinstein the Most Corrupt Senator in the United ...](#)

 <https://pjmedia.com/michaelledeen/2018/09/16/difi-and-the-red-chinese-n188747>

**Dianne Feinstein** Tweets Sexually Explicit Glock Magazine ... This is a good way to measure how little Chinese espionage matters to the nation's law enforcers and opinion makers.

#### [Feinstein's Real Insider Trading Scandal Is Selling ...](#)

 <https://thefederalist.com/2020/03/23/feinsteins-real-insider-trading-scandal-is-selling-america-out-to-china/>

Sen. **Dianne Feinstein** (D-Calif.) rightly faces a potential scandal for dumping several million dollars' worth of stock while privy to sensitive information as a member of the Senate Intelligence ...

#### [Is Dianne Feinstein Corrupt, Stupid or has Dementia—She ...](#)

 [www.capoliticalreview.com/capoliticalnewsandviews/is-dianne-feinstein-corrupt-stupid-or-has-](http://www.capoliticalreview.com/capoliticalnewsandviews/is-dianne-feinstein-corrupt-stupid-or-has-)



[dementia-she-thinks-china-is-respectable/](#)


Is **Dianne Feinstein** Corrupt, Stupid or has Dementia—She Thinks China is Respectable" July 30, 2020 By Stephen Frank 12 Comments This is what Democrat Senator **Feinstein** said, ""We hold China as a potential trading partner, as a country that has pulled tens of millions of people out of poverty in a short period of time, and as a country ...

### [The Corruption of Senator Feinstein](#)

 [https://www.indybay.org/uploads/2015/12/10/feinstein\\_corruption\\_1.2.pdf](https://www.indybay.org/uploads/2015/12/10/feinstein_corruption_1.2.pdf)

Tesla and Solyndra government hand-out funding scandal. • **Feinstein's** daughter, Kathryn, documented illicit actions by her mother, while in social habitation with the applicants • While in the Mayor's office, Bruce Brugman, publisher of the top San Francisco weekly newspaper: The San Francisco Bay Guardian, documented and published nearly 100 **corruption**

### [Senators deny corruption after coronavirus stock dumps](#)

 <https://nypost.com/2020/03/20/senators-deny-theyre-corrupt-after-dumping-stocks-before-coronavirus-crash/>

Mar 20, 2020 Sen. **Dianne Feinstein**, a California Democrat, sold \$500,001 to \$1 million worth of stock in a company called Allogene Therapeutics on Jan. 31, less than a month before panic about the virus caused ...

### [BREAKING: FBI Moves On Dem Senator Dianne Feinstein ...](#)

 <https://rightwingtribune.com/2020/09/08/fbi-moves-on-dem-senator-dianne-feinstein/>

A spokesperson for **Feinstein** told The New York Times Thursday that the FBI asked her "basic questions" last month about stock sales made by her husband, and added that the senator provided requested documents to federal law enforcement that showed she had no involvement in her husband's financial transactions, Daily Caller reports. The 86-year-old California senator sold at least \$1.5 ...

### [You Think Pelosi is Corrupt, But Diane Feinstein IS WORSE ...](#)

 <https://www.investmentwatchblog.com/you-think-pelosi-is-corrupt-but-diane-feinstein-is-worse/>

Mayor **Dianne Feinstein** signed long-term contracts (through 2015) to sell city owned electricity to powerful representative Tony Coelho's district's water utilities at just over cost On August 24, 1985 Mayor **Dianne Feinstein** disclosed ballistics information on a gun used by the Night Stalker Richard Ramirez who was a serial killer and rapist.

### [Dianne Feinstein - Wikipedia](#)

 [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dianne\\_Feinstein](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dianne_Feinstein)

**Dianne** Goldman Berman **Feinstein** (/ ˈ f aɪ n s t aɪ n /; born **Dianne** Emiel Goldman, June 22, 1933) is an American politician serving as the senior United States Senator from California. She took office on November 4, 1992. A member of the Democratic Party, **Feinstein** was Mayor of San Francisco from

1978 to 1988.. Born in San Francisco, **Feinstein** graduated from Stanford University in 1955 with ...

**Dianne Feinstein's Husband Tied To Questionable Dealings ...**

 [https://www.huffpost.com/entry/dianne-feinstein-postal-service\\_n\\_4423045](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/dianne-feinstein-postal-service_n_4423045)

**Dianne Feinstein's** Husband Tied To Questionable Dealings With U.S. Postal Service, Book Says. ...  
Byrne, a California-based freelance writer with a special interest in uncovering government and corporate **corruption**, conducted a yearlong investigation into the real estate portfolio of CBRE for his book, "Going Postal."

**The Feinstein Files: Where did Feinstein make her fortune ...**

 <https://www.investmentwatchblog.com/the-feinstein-files-where-did-feinstein-make-her-fortune/>

Sen. **Dianne Feinstein** (D) California's Sen. **Dianne Feinstein's** estimated \$94 million net worth makes her the second-wealthiest serving senator. Blum Capital, a private equity firm founded in 1975 by her husband. Richard Blum, is the source for most of that wealth.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**When the brats leave Stanford University, half of them move to San Francisco.**

*Coming up next: See what they have turned San Francisco into.*

*We will explore San Francisco's descent into the pits of depravity and corruption in the next chapter...*



## HOW SAN FRANCISCO TURNED INTO A SHIT-HOLE

*The following tiny sample of actual news clips proves that San Francisco City Hall is entirely based on corruption, cronyism, bribes and amateur hour dysfunction of the most extreme kind...*

### SAN FRANCISCO HAS 'GONE TO HELL' SAY COMMUNITY LEADERS

- All of the buildings in downtown San Francisco are cracking and collapsing.
- Drugs and douche-bags everywhere
- Stupid soy boys and naive millennial posers at every corner
- Increasingly corrupt politicians thriving on Dark Money



San Francisco and Silicon Valley are both run by the same dynastic criminally corrupt families and sick perverted insiders. They send their kids to Stanford University where they indoctrinate and brainwash the next generation into a culture of greed, sex, political bribery and Sandhill Road collusion. San Francisco City Hall is powered by hookers, sex and kick-backs. Every attendee at the San Francisco Symphony and Opera opening nights are the "elite" scum of the Pacific Heights money and power manipulation crowd. Old men wield young arm candy as they siphon off taxpayers money into their personal construction and real estate company City contracts. The FBI can't even keep up with all of the crimes. If you think the FBI arrests of Northern California political criminals is going good, know that they FBI has a backlog that is years long. An FBI forensic accounting investigation of the CPA files and investment bank records of each "old San Francisco family" and public official would reveal

stock market crimes, insider trading, real estate money laundering and stock market payola crimes that are Off-The-Scales!

[Life on Dirtiest Block in San Fran...](#)

[Drug dealers flood city...](#)

[People Line Up In Record Numbers At Bay Area Food Bank As SF Tech Rich Watch SF Poor Starve...](#)

[Is tech-dominated SF about to return to its Bohemian roots as Nancy Pelosi's Sodom crumbles?](#)

[San Francisco is a total shithole \(Paul Joseph Watson video\) \(bitchute.com\)](#)

[San Francisco is absolutely degenerate. \(whatever\)](#)

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

So I went to a wedding in Sacramento, and found a cheap flight to Europe out of Oakland a few days later. So girlfriend decided we ought to see San Fransisco for a night. So we hear about a great restaurant, get into SF at like 8, park the car in a well-lit spot and get dinner. After dinner we walk past the car on the way to get some dessert, at 10pm. By the time we get back to the car at 10:30, the back window is smashed, side rear window is smashed, and both my bags are missing. I honestly don't give a fuck if San Fransisco wants to make itself a shithole, but what pisses me the fuck off is that these morherfuckers think they're so fucking smart and they know exactly how to live, and meanwhile crime is out of fucking control to the point that people are smashing car windows at 10pm I'm well lit and well travelled streets, homeless are everywhere, and they want to export the same policies that have destroyed their city and state to the rest of the country. Fuck off California leftists and your fucking bullshit.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**IAN BIRRELL says tech giants have turned San Francisco into a dystopian nightmare of addiction, homelessness and criminality**

- Criminals "Zulu Jones", "Lefty O'Douls Boss", "Shrimpboy Chow", "Francesco "Frank" Lanza", "Roger Boas", "James "Jimmy" Bronkema", "[Aladino "Jimmy the Weasel" Fratianno](#)"...the list of political mobsters in the San Francisco Bay Area goes on and on and on...

By [Ian Birrell for The Mail on Sunday](#)

Gilles Desaulniers moved to San Francisco 40 years ago, settling in the 'friendly, quaint and affordable' city after running out of cash while driving from [Canada](#) down the West Coast of America.

Today he runs a grocery store filled with fresh fruit, vegan snacks and organic wines typical of this famously liberal Californian city.

But Gilles has shut one outlet and would sell up entirely if anyone wanted this one, his remaining

shop.

Each day, up to 30 people stroll in and openly steal goods, costing him hundreds of dollars.



A street cleaner showed me a box filled with used syringes that he had collected, then I met two charity workers picking up needles from the pavement. How many do you find a day, I ask? 'Between 300 and 600, depending on the weather,' one replies. A homeless man is pictured second left using a syringe to inject drugs in the city in June 2018

He has been bitten twice recently by people in his shop and he also found a woman turning blue in the toilet after a drugs overdose, a hypodermic needle still stuck in her leg.

He showed me a metal door that is corroding due to people urinating in his doorway, then spoke of finding a man relieving himself in full view of infants playing in a child centre next door.

'Our society is falling apart,' says Desaulniers.

'If people do not play by some rules, society does not function. But it feels like there is no order, there is no shame.'

He uses two apocalyptic movies to illustrate the state of his adopted city: 'Living here feels like A Clockwork Orange and Blade Runner have both come true.'

I could grasp his despair. I had just passed dealers selling drugs beside a police car parked outside government offices, and seen their customers openly smoke fentanyl, an opioid 50 times stronger than

heroin, then collapse on the street.

- City ranks among worst tax-and-spend offenders...

Yet true to form, San Francisco has just elected as district attorney a radical called Chesa Boudin, whose parents were infamous militants from a far-Left, anti-war group. They were jailed for triple murder when Chesa was a toddler, leaving him to be adopted by the founders of the organisation

All cities have their seedy sides. But this is the very centre of San Francisco, by an upmarket Westfield shopping mall thronged with people in designer clothes perusing Rolex watches, Louis Vuitton handbags and Tiffany jewellery.

The beautiful city by the bay, where Tony Bennett famously left his heart and which poses as a beacon of progressiveness, has more billionaires per capita than any other on the planet.

Not long ago, a seven-bedroom home here recently sold for \$38 million (£29 million), while at the Michelin-starred Saison restaurant, the 'kitchen menu' starts at \$298 a head and reservations require a \$148 deposit.

The city authorities have a huge \$12 billion budget, handing their 31,800 staff average annual pay and benefit packages of an astonishing \$175,000.

Yet the tide of homeless, addicted and mentally ill people washing up here has become so severe that a global expert on slums claimed San Francisco may be more unsanitary than some of the poorest parts of Africa and Asia.

Oracle, one of the technology giants based in the nearby Silicon Valley, has switched a conference for 60,000 people to Las Vegas due to the toxic combination of 'poor street conditions' and costly hotels.

This followed a medical association moving its \$40 million convention out of San Francisco amid safety fears because of sordid tent encampments and overt drug use. Other events are being affected.

'Indoors, people are making deals, talking about healthcare and networking. Yet in the streets, I witnessed homeless people injecting cocaine,' tweeted Kistein Monkhouse while attending a recent J. P. Morgan conference for 9,000 people.

As one prominent academic tells me, it seems a cruel irony that so much squalor and despair is found in the Californian base of all those billionaire technology titans seeking to reshape the world in their image.

'San Francisco has always had hobos but we've never seen anything like this. It's become a vision of some kind of strange dystopian future,' says Joel Kotkin, a widely respected professor in urban studies.

He can reel off damning statistics to back his claim that San Francisco symbolises the Golden State's descent into 'high-tech feudalism' including America's highest poverty levels, its worst rates of property crime and its biggest gap between top and middle incomes.

But one statistic stands out: almost half of homeless people in the United States are in California, according to a recent White House study.



And San Francisco, a comparatively small city that is home to tech giants such as Twitter, Uber and Airbnb, has the highest rate of ‘unsheltered’ citizens – at ten times the national level.

All cities have their seedy sides. But this is the very centre of San Francisco, by an upmarket Westfield shopping mall thronged with people in designer clothes perusing Rolex watches, Louis Vuitton handbags and Tiffany jewellery

Downtown visitors cannot fail to witness the distressing evidence. Almost instantly after I arrived, I saw three people smoking crystal meth through glass pipes, then others with the facial scabs and sores associated with this destructive drug. One man with matted hair sat slumped in a stupor wearing just grubby underpants.

Another, clearly under the influence of heroin, had ‘nodded off’ and was static on a child’s bicycle. A third urinated on the street. A woman changed her clothes from a tatty suitcase on the pavement.

Others shuffled pathetically or rolled slowly along the street in wheelchairs. Some were clearly suffering mental distress, such as a man in his 50s begging for cash who told me he was waiting for his air force pension.

A street cleaner showed me a box filled with used syringes that he had collected, then I met two charity workers picking up needles from the pavement.

How many do you find a day, I ask?

‘Between 300 and 600, depending on the weather,’ one replies.

So if you are going to San Francisco, feel free to wear flowers in your hair but local women say avoid sandals on your feet. Dog owners complain they have to wash human faeces from the legs of their pets after a walk.

One fed-up resident showed me Hondurans handing out socks filled with wraps of drugs in front of a building being turned into an upmarket Whole Foods store.

The dealers displayed little need for concealment. ‘After a while, you become desensitised – it’s like everyone here is wearing blinkers,’ says my guide, a man in his 30s.

‘All my friends with kids have moved out of the city.’

The city and state have some of the highest tax rates in the country, but his area of SoMa West voted to back a fresh charge on firms to fund a new community group to clean up its streets. It is the 17th district to pass such a measure.

‘You have to develop a thick skin,’ says Sonya Lee, 24, supervisor in a Starbucks branch surrounded by bustling boutiques, expensive hotels and smart restaurants. ‘Every day, people come in and take stuff. It’s dreadful but we don’t know what to do.’

San Francisco, a comparatively small city that is home to tech giants such as Twitter, Uber and Airbnb, has the highest rate of ‘unsheltered’ citizens – at ten times the national level

Official data, based on one night’s count last year, claimed 8,011 homeless people in this city of

884,000 people – a rise of 17 per cent on 2017.

But a record of those receiving healthcare found numbers twice as high and rising faster.

City authorities claim their key problem is the high cost of housing combined with past failures to build enough properties. But many blame something simpler to solve: the lack of law enforcement.

‘When you tell vagrants that anything goes, it leads to the anarchy you see on these streets,’ says Heather MacDonald, a fellow at the Manhattan Institute think-tank and a conservative essayist.

She believes we are witnessing a ‘real-life experiment’ into what happens if society stops enforcing bourgeois norms out of sensitivity to vulnerable people.

MacDonald argues that the city authorities are culpable, fuelling drug addiction by doling out 4.5 million needles a year when there is nothing compassionate about giving addicts and mentally ill people the freedom to ‘decompose’ on the streets.

Much of what she says is backed by Thomas Wolf, 49, who lost his job and family after becoming addicted to opioid painkillers following foot surgery, then moving on to cheaper heroin and ending up homeless in his native city.

‘It is a cycle of despair,’ he says. ‘I was heartbroken at losing my wife and kids but all I cared about was drugs. I hated being on the streets but I loved the easy access to drugs.’

‘Yet there’s such denial that if you’d have asked me if I had a problem, I’d have said no.’

Wolf, who now works for the Salvation Army helping homeless people rebuild lives and has just been appointed to a specialist civic taskforce, sees untreated addiction as the root cause of the city’s problem. He says most people living on the streets are hooked on either drugs or drink.

‘If you see someone shouting at the wall, it is crystal meth, not mental illness – although meth might have destroyed their mind.’

Wolf claims that while the city distributes drug paraphernalia, he was never asked to quit or offered help. He says many users sell their monthly welfare \$190 food stamps on receipt to go on a binge. And he wants to see generous welfare benefits – almost \$600 a month in return for 12 hours of voluntary work – slashed.

His own time as a homeless heroin addict ended after police caught him holding six socks filled with drugs for Honduran dealers. His brother bailed him from jail on condition that he went into rehab.

He was lucky. Last year there were 234 deaths from fentanyl and heroin in the city, more than double the previous year and five times higher than in 2016.

Wolf believes that the decision by a state ballot six years ago to reclassify thefts of property below the value of \$950 as misdemeanours has backfired badly, leading to a huge increase in shoplifting.

‘It is a disaster,’ he says. ‘The idea was sound – to reduce jailing that is predominantly of minorities – but the side effect was to embolden people to commit crime with impunity. Everyone knows you can go into shops and steal up to \$950.’

Even shampoo, deodorant and toothpaste are now locked up in chemist shops to curb thefts.

The police declined to speak officially. But one officer sitting in his car beside blatant street-dealing said there was no point arresting people as they would simply be released, even if they were carrying drugs and cash valued at several thousand dollars.

‘I find it very frustrating and lots of my colleagues find it very frustrating,’ he says, adding that officers only intervene when there is violence. ‘We get the blame because people think we’re doing nothing. But it’s not our fault.’

Wes Tyler, manager of a family-owned hotel, told me a man high on crystal meth smashed a \$5,000 window one Sunday afternoon – then repeatedly ignored court dates and probation orders despite being seen in the neighbourhood last week.

‘If City Hall does not start to take these issues more seriously, we’ll see businesses impacted,’ says Jay Cheng, spokesman for the local Chamber of Commerce.

Yet true to form, San Francisco has just elected as district attorney a radical called Chesa Boudin, whose parents were infamous militants from a far-Left, anti-war group. They were jailed for triple murder when Chesa was a toddler, leaving him to be adopted by the founders of the organisation.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*



The beautiful city by the bay, where Tony Bennett famously left his heart and which poses as a beacon



of progressiveness, has more billionaires per capita than any other on the planet. Not long ago, a seven-bedroom home here recently sold for \$38 million (£29 million), while at the Michelin-starred Saison restaurant, the ‘kitchen menu’ starts at \$298 a head and reservations require a \$148 deposit

The 39-year-old, who studied at Oxford University as a Rhodes scholar and later worked as a translator for Venezuela’s former leader Hugo Chavez, a Fidel Castro acolyte, campaigned on moving away from prosecuting ‘quality of life’ offences to focus on serious and corporate offences.

The San Francisco Police Officers Association spent heavily campaigning against Boudin, saying he was the choice for ‘criminals and gang members’.

But Jennifer Friedenbach, executive director of the charity Coalition on Homelessness, argues city residents should get angry over ‘systemic neglect’ that sparked this crisis rather than blaming people on the streets.

‘No one wants to live like this,’ she says. ‘We’ve tried locking people up before but that didn’t work.’

Friedenbach insists that the problems stem from a lack of affordable housing, a significant reduction of emergency shelters and the slashing of spending on treatment programmes.

She says, rightly, that issues of homelessness, mental health and addiction are often linked.

The city’s mayor, London Breed, whose younger sister died of a drug overdose and elder brother was jailed for robbery, declined to comment.

In her inaugural speech, Breed said the ‘twin troubles of homelessness and housing affordability’ were the big challenge.

She is boosting grants for shelters, treatment and street cleaning. Yet those desperate sights staining this one-time hippy nirvana are ultimately the sign of abject political failure.

Her new fiefdom is, after all, so populated by millionaires in their exclusive enclaves that it is the second richest city in the world’s richest nation.

Considering the city’s wealth, it smacks of callous and uncaring hypocrisy.

As one local resident says: ‘Are they really being progressive to that poor guy in the street with a needle in his arm who is going to die tomorrow?’

[John Gabriel: California Is A Failed State; How Do We Know? They’re Moving To Arizona In Doves](#)

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

[Median price for Bay Area home hits record-shattering \\$935,000...](#)

[Woman allegedly calls cops on girl selling water in San Fran...](#)

[Gay Tech Mafia runs Silicon Valley and San Francisco](#)

[Meanwhile on the West Coast... Downtown San Francisco Littered with Drug Needles, Piles of Feces \(breitbart.com\)](#)

[Diseased Streets: San Francisco Spends \\$30 Million Cleaning Feces, Needles. City "among some of the worst slums in the world." \(nbcbayarea.com\)](#)

[When people refuse to navigate piles of human shit to get food, San Francisco has the answer - BAN company owned cafeterias to "protect" local restaurants. \(m.washingtontimes.com\)](#)

[San Fran Diseased Streets... Needles, Garbage, Feces... Like Worst Slums in World...](#)

San Francisco mayor admits she was screwing corruption boss and took thousands of dollars of cash from top crook in FBI corruption probe

By [Brie Stimson |](#)

[San Francisco](#) Mayor London Breed on Friday admitted having a 20-year friendship and brief romantic relationship with a former city worker now under [FBI](#) investigation, prompting some to call for her resignation.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

### **San Francisco Is One Of The Most Corrupt Cities In The World**

San Francisco Mayors, Area Senators and Supervisors exist off of bribes. Facebook, Google, Twitter, Tesla, Chevron, Wells Fargo, Real Estate developers and Chinese mobsters are the biggest payers of bribes. They pay in cash, hookers, buildings, stock warrants and election manipulation. San Francisco politicians pretend to be "green" but they only care about Green Cash. They pretend to be a "Sanctuary City" but all they care about is harboring criminals who they can use to puff up voter counts.

San Francisco cares about one thing: CASH!

If there is a second thing they care about it is: PRETENTIOUS LIFESTYLES

Chicago is corrupt because of the mafia and gangster culture it supports. San Francisco is corrupt because it has no moral compass except the arrow that points straight to hell. Greed and power rule all decisions in San Francisco politics.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

['Corrupt in its roots': as Oakland police scandals pile up ...](#)

May 21, 2016 · Donald Trump may have called the city one of the 'most dangerous' in the world, ... 'Corrupt in its roots': as ... the city across the bay from San Francisco ...

<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/may/21/oakland-police-miscon...>

[Report on the Causes of Municipal Corruption ... - San Francisco](#)

Report on the Causes of Municipal Corruption in San Francisco, ... No one of the many persons we have ... "The undersigned of the City of San Francisco, ...

 [sfmuseum.org/hist5/graft1.html](http://sfmuseum.org/hist5/graft1.html)

<http://www.freewebs.com/boycottsanfrancisco/>

### **SSF Lawmaker Urges Charges In Corruption Probe: OP-ED**

South San Francisco, CA - Several local lawmakers including State Senator Jerry Hill are urging the state AG to file charges in a CPUC corruption probe.

<https://patch.com/california/southsanfrancisco/ssf-lawmaker...>

### **CORRUPTION CENTRAL: PETER P. McDONOUGH - FoundSF**

CORRUPTION CENTRAL: PETER P. McDONOUGH. ... San Francisco History ... from FOUNTAINHEAD OF CORRUPTION: Peter P. McDonough, Boss of San Francisco's Underworld by ...

[foundsf.org/index.php?title=CORRUPTION\\_CENTRAL:\\_PETER...](http://foundsf.org/index.php?title=CORRUPTION_CENTRAL:_PETER...)

### **San Francisco city employees in court facing public ...**

Two former San Francisco city officials and a longtime city staffer appeared in court on Friday, facing public corruption charges.

[abc7news.com/politics/sf-city-employees-in-court-facin...](http://abc7news.com/politics/sf-city-employees-in-court-facin...)

### **Are corrupt politicians the cause of sky-high San Francisco ...**

Are corrupt politicians the cause of sky-high San Francisco ... What is the most corrupt city agency in San Francisco? ... effect on San Francisco real estate. No one ...

 <https://www.quora.com/Are-corrupt-politicians-the-cause-of-sky-..>

### **California state Sen. Yee arrested in corruption case - SFGate**

The former San Francisco school board member, ... He was reportedly arrested on public corruption charges Wednesday morning amid raids of his office in Sacramento and ...

 [sfgate.com/politics/article/California-state-Sen-Yee..](http://sfgate.com/politics/article/California-state-Sen-Yee..)

### **San Francisco corruption probe ensnares six current or ... - CNN**

Five San Francisco police officers and one former cop were indicted Thursday by federal grand juries in connection with a corruption investigation.

[cnn.com/2014/02/27/justice/san-francisco-police-c...](http://cnn.com/2014/02/27/justice/san-francisco-police-c...)

### **San Francisco Corruption: Mayor, prosecutor, gangster Shrimp ...**

San Francisco Mayor Ed Lee, seen here in 2011, is accused in a new court filing of using officials in his

adminsitration to collect bribes. Photo by Justin ...

 [slate.com/blogs/the\\_slatest/2015/08/04/san\\_francisc...](https://slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/08/04/san_francisc...)

### **Who might be next? San Francisco's long-running political ...**

He cited a San Francisco prosecution a ... Gascon's words that day provided the first hint that a long-running political corruption probe here might not be over ...

 [latimes.com/local/california/la-me-sf-probe-20160225-...](https://latimes.com/local/california/la-me-sf-probe-20160225-...)

### **San Francisco police corruption investigation ... - Fox News**

The San Francisco police chief is seeking to fire eight officers and discipline six others involved in a racist texting scandal.

[foxnews.com/us/2015/05/15/san-francisco-police-corrup...](https://foxnews.com/us/2015/05/15/san-francisco-police-corrup...)

### **3 San Francisco city officials may face trial on corruption ...**

First a Chinatown gangster dubbed Shrimp Boy and state Senator Leland Yee were both nabbed in a federal corruption sting. Now three others who were also targets of ...

[abc7news.com/3-sf-city-officials-may-face-trial-on-cor...](https://abc7news.com/3-sf-city-officials-may-face-trial-on-cor...)

### **How to fix San Francisco's corruption problem - by b stuart ...**

Corruption. It's as San Francisco as fog, organic produce and good weed. And by that I mean, it's such a part of the culture here that we take it for grant

### **San Francisco's Homeless Encampments Expose The Failure Of A Liberal Utopia**

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

### **San Francisco Is Now The Most Rapidly Failing City In America**

In America's most liberal city, increasingly visible homeless camps are a stark symbol of San Francisco's economic hollowing out and the failure of progressive governance.



By [John Daniel Davidson](#)

SAN FRANCISCO – “You want the down-low? I’ll give you the down-low. These guys will all tell you something different, but the one thing everyone here has in common is that they all do drugs.”

I’m talking to a group of homeless men camped out under Highway 101 in San Francisco’s Mission neighborhood, where a half-dozen tents are set up on a wide sidewalk across the street from a Best Buy. The thirtysomething guy who’s telling me it’s all about drugs doesn’t want to give me his name.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**Shit-Hole San Francisco — where drug addicts outnumber high school students**

Officer Brian Donohue checks on Jeffrey Choate after he sees him lying on the sidewalk along Larkin Street and asks him to dispose of used needles next to him in a proper container on Monday, September 10, 2018 in San Francisco has more drug addicts than it has students enrolled in its public high schools, the city Health Department’s latest estimates conclude. There are about 24,500 injection drug users in San Francisco — that’s about 8,500 more people than the nearly 16,000 students enrolled in San Francisco Unified School District’s 15 high schools and illustrates the scope of the problem on the city’s streets. It’s also an increase of about 2,000 serious drug users since 2012, the last time a study was done. “There is an opioid epidemic in this country, and San Francisco is no exception,” Deputy Director of Health Dr. Naveena Bobba said.

The problem is particularly visible in the Tenderloin, where police reported more than 600 arrests for drug dealing last year. And where 27 suspects were booked into County Jail for dealing drugs in the first 20 days of the new year. The out-in-the-open use of drugs on city sidewalks and at the Civic Center BART Station was a huge embarrassment for the city and triggered more police patrols and crackdowns in the past year. The BART station has been cleaned up, but the problem continues in the Tenderloin. And while the police stay busy targeting dealers — the criminal side of illegal drugs — the city’s public health officials work the problem as a health crisis.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**NIMBY HELL**

The San Francisco Board of Supervisors voted 7-4 on Tuesday to overturn [the 2015 sale of Presidio Terrace](#), a privately-owned street in the neighborhood of the same name used by a few dozen of the city’s wealthiest homeowners, faulting the city’s tax collector and not the residents for letting an annual \$14 tax bill go unpaid for decades.

Supervisor Mark Farrell, whose district includes Presidio Terrace, scheduled Tuesday’s hearing in August, allegedly to “get to the bottom” of the dispute and let all parties plead their case.

A South Bay couple bought Presidio Terrace's circular street and accompanying sidewalks at a tax sale to the tune of \$90,000 after the Presidio Terrace Association (PTA) had failed to pay the taxes on their avenue for 30 years.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*



[Residents are FLEEING Sanctuary City San Francisco at a RECORD RATE!\(youtube.com\)](#)

**SAN FRANCISCO HAS TURNED INTO THE BIGGEST SHIT-HOLE CITY IN AMERICA**

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

[San Francisco street fight \(youtube.com\)](#)

[Commiefornia - Colin Flaherty: San Francisco Techies Surprised by the Level of Black Violence \(hooktube.com\)](#)

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA VENTURE CAPITALISTS PROVE THEIR CORRUPTION RUNS DEEP**

The founder of a Silicon Valley venture capital firm was sentenced Wednesday to six months behind bars for paying about \$450,000 in bribes to boost his two daughters' entrance exam scores and get one of them into Georgetown University as a bogus tennis recruit.

Manuel Henriquez, the 57-year-old founder and ex-CEO of Hercules Capital based in Palo Alto, California, cried and dabbed his eyes with a tissue as he prayed for forgiveness from his children and other families he hurt, and asked the judge for mercy. "There is no perfect way to express how broken I feel in my heart and soul," said Henriquez, who sat next to his lawyer and wore a face mask for much of the hearing held via video conference because of the coronavirus pandemic.

His wife, Elizabeth Henriquez, was sentenced in March to seven months behind bars. She is currently locked up at a prison in California and is expected to be released in January, according to online records. Prosecutors had asked for five months for Manuel Henriquez, calling him in court documents a "less active participant in the mechanics of the fraud than his wife." The defense urged the judge for three months or less. U.S. District Judge Nathaniel Gorton called Henriquez a hypocrite who donated

money to aid children, while at the same time using his wealth and privilege to put his kids ahead of other less fortunate students in the college admissions process.

“It’s a sad day,” the judge said. A high-school senior had deftly promoted her “brand” for the Ivy League, a college consultant boasted. In a 2013 promotional video, William Rick Singer, the mastermind of an elaborate admissions corruption scheme, showered praises on the young woman.

She’d started her own organization to fight climate change, he said. She’d eventually enroll in Brown. That student, it turns out, was Mary Doerr, a daughter of John Doerr, the Silicon Valley venture capitalist and early backer of Google and Amazon. The Doerrs were clients of Singer years before he turned a legitimate college consulting practice into an elaborate bribery-for-admissions scheme that has shaken American academia, the parents who sought Singer’s advice and the Wall Street and Silicon Valley firms that are now dealing with the fallout.

Pro golfer Phil Mickelson and National Football League Hall of Fame quarterback Joe Montana each tweeted last week that their families had used Singer for college consulting and were “shocked” to hear about the illegal activity. So are some of the Wall Street and Silicon Valley companies who had connections to Singer, including Goldman Sachs Group Inc., bond-giant PIMCO and venture-capital firm Kleiner Perkins Caulfield & Byers, which Doerr co-founded and is chairman.

Court papers suggest as many as 800 families hired Singer at some point. Singer ran an apparently legitimate college counseling firm, the Edge College & Career Network, before about 2011. The 2013 promotional video that referred to Mary Doerr says she was a client “six years ago,” or about 2007. The bribery case reaches back only to 2011. The Doerr family has not been accused of any wrongdoing. Mary Doerr graduated from Brown University in 2015 and now is a graduate student at North Carolina State University, according to her LinkedIn profile.

Calls to Mary Doerr and her mother, Anne, were not returned. A Kleiner Perkins spokeswoman, Katie Hutchison, didn’t respond to a request to speak with John Doerr. Hutchison declined to answer questions but said in a written statement that while Doerr and partner Tom Schlein, “along with a long list of Valley luminaries,” were clients of Singer, they consulted him only for “test tutoring and help with college applications — typical of services provided by thousands of private college counselors across the country — and nothing further.”

Goldman Sachs, which was mentioned in a wiretapped phone conversation as a social connection for at least one of the parents charged in Singer’s bribery-for-admissions scheme, says it has begun an internal investigation into any connection its employees may have to the former college consultant.

Firms whose partners and employees were caught up in the federal case known as “Operation Varsity Blues” have swiftly moved to fire or accept the resignations of people involved.

Bond-giant PIMCO said in a statement on Monday that “as part of a regular series that includes dozens of outside speakers, PIMCO invited Mr. Singer to speak twice over the past decade, the latest in 2015, about the college admissions process.” But the firm added that it “has never had a business relationship with Rick Singer or his college preparation organization. Neither PIMCO nor the PIMCO Foundation has ever paid Mr. Singer or donated money to his foundation.”



The statement added that any employees who engaged with Singer’s illegal scheme “would have no place at the firm.”

PIMCO’s former chief executive Douglas Hodge, who retired in 2017, is accused of paying about \$500,000 in bribes for two daughters and a son to be admitted to Georgetown University and the University of Southern California as fake tennis, soccer and football recruits.

The case has also sent shivers among affluent parents who fear they and their children will be tarnished as the Singer case unfolds.

Families now in the admissions process “want to illustrate that they’re a good family that wouldn’t cheat and that their kids would never want them to cheat the process,” said Christine Pluta, a private counselor with Edvise Princeton who has also worked in the admissions offices of the University of Pennsylvania and Barnard College. “I have never before heard a family try to convince me of their own integrity. Singer is part of the conversation.”

Pluta said when she worked at Penn about 20 years ago, a “father offered me a million dollars if his daughter would be admitted. At first I thought he was joking.” She said she made it clear the offer was inappropriate.

Singer cooperated with authorities and pleaded guilty to facilitating more than \$25 million in bribes for faked ACT and SAT scores and bogus athletic profiles to schools including the USC, Georgetown and Yale University. Parents contributed to Singer’s fake charity, Key Worldwide Foundation, to facilitate bribes to coaches and school officials and some and some took the charitable-donation deduction.

The wealthy parents worked in finance, sports and entertainment and included actresses Lori Loughlin and Felicity Huffman as well as Hodge, who was replaced as CEO of PIMCO in 2016; Gordon Caplan, the co-chairman of global law firm Wilkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, and William McGlashan Jr., a former partner of private equity firm TPG, who was fired last week.

The relationships in those worlds led to some embarrassing revelations for firms who invited Singer to speak.

“We know people at Goldman Sachs who have, you know, recommended you highly,” said parent Marci Palatella, according to transcripts of a wiretapped conversation with Singer.

Palatella, chief executive officer of a liquor distribution company in Burlingame, Calif., and the wife of former San Francisco 49ers player Lou Palatella, was charged with paying \$575,000 in bribes to get their son into USC as a fake “long snapper” football recruit.

Goldman Sachs spokesman Patrick Scanlan said Monday that “we’re continuing to look into the matter.”

Another parent charged in the scandal referenced Kleiner Perkins. In a wiretapped conversation, parent Bruce Isackson worried that the Internal Revenue Service might discover the bogus charity, to which Isackson is accused of paying hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes to get his daughter into USC as a fake-recruited rower.

Isackson, who was president of real-estate development firm WP Investments in Woodside, Calif., was charged along with his wife, Davina. He no longer appears on the website of the firm, which didn't respond to calls.

"Is this gonna be this — be the front page story with everyone from Kleiner Perkins do whatever, getting these kids into school," Isackson said according to the transcript.

In the 2013 promotional video, Singer spoke of an unnamed client who had started Inconvenient Youth while in high school. "She got totally engaged in her brand, in her story, in her passion," he said in the short video, adding that "I had her six years ago as a student" and thanking former Vice President Al Gore for allowing "us" to use his slide show from his 2006 documentary, "An Inconvenient Truth," that inspired Doerr's group.

Singer added that getting in to college "has to do with getting involved in your brand." He highlighted his role in Mary Doerr's venture, saying that "we wanted to create an organization that would focus on global warming for youth."

Mary Doerr started Inconvenient Youth in 2008 between her junior and senior years at Castilleja School in Palo Alto, Calif.

John Doerr, whose net worth Forbes puts at \$7.5 billion, has been involved in education issues for some time. He is co-founder and lifetime director of the NewS chools Venture Fund, which invests in start-ups aimed at improving public education. He and Anne Doerr donated \$50 million in 2015 to Rice University, his alma mater, to finance a leadership training program.

The couple paid about \$50,000 bribes to have someone cheat multiple times on standardized tests for their daughters, authorities said. The Henriquezes were also charged with paying \$400,000 to the sham charity run by admissions consultant Rick Singer to get their oldest daughter into Georgetown by falsely portraying her as a star tennis player. Singer in turn paid then-Georgetown tennis coach Gordon Ernst in exchange for labeling her as a recruit, authorities say.

Ernst, who's accused of getting nearly \$3 million in bribes, has pleaded not guilty.

Singer has pleaded guilty to running the sprawling bribery scheme and helped investigators build the case against the parents.

Henriquez's lawyers said in court documents that his participation in the scheme was "minor and largely passive" as he was busy running his company while his wife "devoted herself to the care and well-being of their children."

"Mr. Henriquez knew some but not all of the details of the scheme with Singer, played a small role, and to his great regret and shame, did not stop it. He paid Singer's bills, as he did all the family's bills," his lawyers said in a court filing.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Eric Rosen said it "strains credulity" that Henriquez would believe that the \$400,000 payment to Singer's sham charity would support "underfunded college athletic programs (including Georgetown tennis) and programs for disadvantaged youth," as his attorneys claimed in court documents.

Rosen accused Henriquez of refusing to fully accept responsibility for his actions and attempting to present a "sanitized version of the conduct to the court."

The Henriquezes are among nearly 30 parents who've admitted to charges in the massive case called "Operation Varsity Blues."

"Full House" star Lori Loughlin and her fashion designer husband, Mossimo Giannulli, are scheduled to be sentenced in August after pleading guilty to paying half a million dollars to get their two daughters into the University of Southern California as fake crew recruits. Loughlin's plea deal calls for her to serve two months behind bars and Giannulli's calls for him to serve five months.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

### Gavin Newsom Netted Millions (Tax-Free) In Undisclosed "Sweetheart" Loans

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**SAN FRANCISCO NOW THE #1 PLACE IN AMERICA TO GET AN AWFUL SEX DISEASE!**

STDs i California reach all-time high: 300,000 cases...

SAN FRANCISCO Gives ILLEGAL ALIENS Right To Vote in order to try to jam up elections \*  
100PercentFedUp.com (100percentfedup.com)

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

Home Prices In 80% Of US Cities Grew 2x Faster Than Wages... And Then There Is San Francisco (zerohedge.com)

Source: <http://nbclosangeles.com/news/california/San-Francisco-to-Hire-Needle-Cleanup-Team-480616941.html>

[Show more from nbclosangeles.com](#)

The mayor of San Francisco says he's hiring 10 workers whose sole responsibility will be to clean up the massive numbers of drug needles littering the streets.

San Francisco Mayor Mark Farrell said Monday the team will respond to resident complaints and remove needles and syringes from "hot spots" every day of the week.

Farrell tells the [San Francisco Examiner](#) that discarded syringes on the streets are among the top litter complaints in the city with a growing homelessness problem and a devotion to encouraging hippie

scum to live there.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

### **San Francisco Forensic Investigator Paul Kangas Keeps The Ruling Elite On Their Toes**

Don't do crime with public money in front of Paul Kangas. This modern Sam Spade will latch onto the case like a pit-bull and never let go. If City Hall, Silicon Valley or the Opera Crowd get into bribery, corruption, sex trafficking and other dirty bits, Paul might end up on their heels.

As the former guard for President Kennedy, Paul Kangas is now a private Investigator in California. His seminal article on the role of George HW Bush in the assassination of JFK was just published on the front page of the Cuban newspaper, Granma. 30 million copies were distributed worldwide. He has taught, and inspired, many contemporary media investigators who have over-turned the entire news industry with the kinds of FBI-class public research that Kangas uses. The many "citizen sleuth" groups operating around the world were inspired by the early work of Kangas.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

### **San Francisco Nurses Demand to Have Mark Zuckerberg's Name Taken Off Hospital**

- Corrupt Zuckerberg found to be using the sick as a tax evasion ploy
- Patients, public and staff object to a hospital being named after the world's largest human rights abuser
- Mayor Ed Lee died at Zuckerberg Hospital due to politics
- Facebook found to be spying on patients and selling their private medical data to governments and political groups


BY [PAULA BOLYARD](#)

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

### **San Francisco: Democrat LGBT Lutheran Pastor And Friends Arrested In Child Porn Raid**

Five pedophiles at a Pro-LGBT Church have been arrested by San Francisco's Child Exploitation Task Forces for the production of child pornography. Controversial Gay Pastor of Christ Church Lutheran in San Francisco, the Rev. Steven Sabin, heads the congregations.

Reverend Steven Sabin is the head pastor at the Christ Church Lutheran national website, where he hosts streaming podcasts worldwide.



The Christ Lutheran Church says that they're aware of the Pastor's arrest.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*



[San Francisco Is An Uninhabitable Hellhole...](#)

[Rats, Public Defecation, Open Drug Use...](#)

**San Francisco Tech Executives And City Hall Directors Play A Dangerous Game With Trophy Wives and Prostitutes**

By Lucy Carl

Driven by a psychopathic need to employ sex for power instead of passion, executives from Salesforce, Twitter, Google, Facebook and other famous brands, live a life of debauchery few normal people can comprehend.

Almost every \$200K/year executive has both a “trophy” wife and a bevy of prostitutes on call. Most of them get the wives and the hookers from many of the same resources. Most of the prostitutes know about the trophy wives, and vice versa, because it is part of “The Deal”.

The San Francisco Zoo fundraising parties, The “House Parties” (on Broadway, west of Divisadero in the tony Pacific Heights neighborhood), San Francisco Symphony parties and Opening Nights, The Red and White Ball Events, The Guardsman parties, The Spinster Events, The Rosewood Hotel “tech events” and a horde of other elitist find-some-ass events deliver the chicks to the Chads.

A Trophy Wife is a surgically enhanced woman who dresses like a Playboy model, wears porno makeup and has a Jessica Rabbit type of cartoonish facial structure. She is acquired by the tech executive to show off to other tech executives. An unusually large number of San Francisco tech executives are homosexual but they still have Trophy wives to keep up appearances.

At one of these events a young, attractive woman will approach a recently divorced tech executive and advise him that she understands “the Deal”. She uses code words and alluded to references but the intent is clear. She is willing to be either a trophy wife or a prostitute because the guy has the cash and she wants the rich lifestyle. A trophy wife is aware that she must accept the fact that the man is rich and can get any woman and there is a 3000 to 1 ratio of hot girls to rich men. If she wants the cash she must accept the non-monogamous sex-with-other-women culture of the tech males.

The Trophy Wives get to live in the big houses with the tech guys and the prostitutes live in apartments in Marin County and Palo Alto. Many of the prostitutes are from overseas and are known as “Instagram Girls” because they advertise on Instagram and Match.com as “models”. Hundreds of these internet hookers are flown into San Francisco, Oakland and San Jose international airports, daily, on the credit cards of these tech executives. The pot is well stocked. San Francisco tech executives account for as much bay area sex trafficking, in dollar volume, as the San Francisco Chinatown gangs. A San Francisco tech prostitute goes for \$1000.00 to \$10000.00 per night while a Chinatown sex worker is only \$300.00 per session.

There are over 200 “Personal Services” providers for tech executives who pitch “managing engagement schedules” for CEO’s. They are pimps who have networked lists of hookers. They are usually women in the PR business who once were trophy wives, or prostitutes, themselves when they were younger. Most tech executives will eventually receive an offer from a “Social Events Manager”, looking to hook them up.

Trophy Wives and prostitute offerings can be found jogging on San Francisco’s Marina Green, sitting overtly in outdoor cafe’s on Chestnut Street and Union Street in the Marina district and at every “tech event”. They dress in fluorescent Spandex with bare midriff tops and painted on Spandex leggings shoved as far up their butt-crack as biology will allow. The regulars, though, are at the elite events and fund-raisers.

The websites BACKPAGE.COM, SEEKING ARRANGEMENTS.COM and MATCH.COM are the source favored by the tech guys for girls-on-demand hookers. Google is in a huge battle against the government because Google does not want BACKPAGE.COM shut down. It is the top source for hookers for the men of Google.

The parties at the French, British and Russian embassies are notoriously full of high-class hookers and wannabe trophy wife candidates. The key to confirming them, in person, or on Match.com, is the use of code words like “generous gentlemen”, “appreciates a special women”, “knows how to take care of..”, “diamonds..” and other subliminal references.

The game can go south, though. Google’s, Tesla Investments and other top executives have been killed by their hookers. Over 100 top tech execs are now in the news for their over-the-top sex scandals. A Trophy Wife or a Hooker can blackmail the tech executives at any moment; non-disclosure agreements be damned. Hundreds of babies are now being paid for by hundreds of tech executives along with hush-money to keep the names of those babies fathers quiet.

Yes, San Francisco truly is the modern version of Sodom and Gomorrah.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**San Francisco accepted Hunters Point shipyard land that may still be radioactive**

EPA, state health regulators approved transfer in 2015 despite awareness of fraud allegations

By [Chris Roberts@cbloggy](mailto:Chris.Roberts@cbloggy)

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**SAN FRANCISCO HOUSING MARKET IS GETTING GUTTED AS FACEBOOK CRASHES AND CHINESE RUN AWAY**

[Housing market showing signs of cracking...](#)

[Record Drop in Foreigners Buying...](#)

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**SAN FRANCISCO IS NOW THE MOST EXTREME PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE CITY IN**



## AMERICA

HIPPIE DIPPIES IN SAN FRANCISCO ARE THE MOST SPIED ON IN USA! IRONIC!

Can you imagine a city in the United States secretly creating a Chinese-style public surveillance network that can identify everyone? Can you imagine that same city secretly creating a Chinese-style public watchlisting network?

Well imagine no more because it has already happened.

When I wrote about ["covert facial recognition street lights coming to a city near you"](#) last year, I never would have dreamt that my article would become a reality so quickly.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**San Francisco is now POOP CITY as heroin needles, AIDS and corruption again define City**

Tourists and shoppers make their way past a panhandler asleep outside a clothing store in San Francisco on Aug. 25. The streets of San Francisco have long reflected the eccentric city's governing priorities and many civic contradictions arising from the intersection of wealth and poverty. (Mason Trinca/For The Washington Post)

By [Scott Wilson](#)

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**San Francisco Millennium Tower is leaning, sinking and now cracking thanks to corrupt Ed Lee**

San Francisco's leaning, sinking Millennium Tower has a new problem after a window cracked on the 36th floor. by Melanie Woodrow

San Francisco's leaning, sinking Millennium Tower has a new problem after a window cracked on the 36th floor.

"This is a window system that's designed to sustain hurricane force winds so this is obviously of serious concern," said San Francisco Supervisor Aaron Peskin.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**San Francisco in one photograph: Rich liberals sip \$30 glasses of wine as they watch the city burn**

I lived there, in North Beach for more than a decade. I recently left, and feel such a sense of relief. I can't turn this into a joke since I know that place, but this caption isn't far off. These people will continue to look at all the shit they vote for, and watch how it went wrong, blame someone else, and double down on their bullshit. Fuck that place. They deserve the shit that's coming to them.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**San Francisco's Free Syringes Are Littering Its Streets - Come For The Heroin, Stay For The Corruption** ([sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com](https://www.sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com))

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**SAN FRANCISCO MAYOR LONDON BREED EXEMPLIFIES THE WARPED SEX-BASED CRONYISM OF SAN FRANCISCO CITY HALL**

Mayor London Breed exhibited a serious lapse of judgment — and [possibly violated city ethics laws](#) — in accepting several thousand dollars worth of car-related expenses from former Public Works Director Mohammed Nuru.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**San Francisco Downtown Buildings Are Collapsing And Falling Apart As SF Earth Mass Found To Be Unstable**

- City Officials will lie until the cows come home but the fact is that greedy mayor and supervisors overbuilt City to get bribes and developer fees
- When will the first skyscraper collapse and kill huge numbers of people?

BY JANIE HAR AND PAUL ELIAS Associated Press

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**Saudi ties entangle Laurene Powell Jobs' Emerson Collective**

Jamal Khashoggi's disappearance has become a litmus test for business leaders, but some ties are more nuanced — and perhaps more complicated.

by Dylan Byers

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

[San Francisco Spends \\$30 Million Cleaning Feces, And Use Drug Needles From It's Hepatitis Infected Streets - Literally A U.S. SHITHOLE !!! \(nbcbayarea.com\)](#)

[Bay Area reaches highest exodus levels in 10 years. U-Haul says it is running out of 1 way trucks. \(archive.is\)](#)

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**San Francisco Has The Most High-Tech Schools In The World But SF Students Are The Biggest Failures In The World**

- San Francisco proves, again, that it is all fluff and no substance
- Bottom line: "Don't move to San Francisco if you want your kids to get an education!"

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**San Francisco's housing market is so out of control, most tech workers say they can't afford homes thanks to Google**

[Melia Robinson](#)

San Francisco is too expensive even for tech workers. HBO

- **The San Francisco Bay Area's housing market is so bleak, even tech workers are struggling to buy a home there.**
- **A survey by Blind found that 59% of employees at Bay Area tech companies said they cannot afford homes.**
- **Cisco, eBay, and Intuit had the highest percentage of employees who said home ownership is elusive.**

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

San Francisco Employee privacy is at stake as corporate surveillance technology monitors Bay Area workers' every move

[Ellen Sheng@ellensheng](mailto:Ellen.Sheng@ellensheng)

#### Key Points

- Corporate interest in surveillance seems to be on the rise to boost productivity.
- A 2018 survey by Gartner found that 22% of organizations worldwide are using employee-movement data, 17% are monitoring work-computer-usage data, and 16% are using Microsoft Outlook- or calendar-usage data.
- Employees are concerned over this invasion of privacy.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

[San Francisco Logs 16,000 Feces Complaints in a Week as San Francisco becomes filled with poop and Google assholes...](#)

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

[WINNING: Arizona Appellate Court decides Nancy Pelosi's Hockey Stick emails must be released \(wattsupwiththat.com\)](#)

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**San Francisco Shall Forever Be Known as POOP CITY because of the corrupt politicians and dirty people that live there**

[Poop City \(San Francisco\)-We find you with a straw, you're going to jail...but come here if you want a safe place to shoot up heroin, we'll make sure you don't die!\(nbcbayarea.com\)](#)

[San Francisco's Human Poop Map Shows City Is in Deep Doo-Doo](#)

San Francisco is swiftly moving from one of America's most beautiful cities to one of America's most troubled cities. The city struggles with crime and the consequences of illegal immigration after declaring themselves a "sanctuary city". The transit authorities (BART) recently announced ...

[!\[\]\(248b91fcdac4810ffd15cf33fb6aec6f\_img.jpg\)https://www.redstate.com/kiradavis/2017/10/17/san-franciscos-human...](https://www.redstate.com/kiradavis/2017/10/17/san-franciscos-human...)

[San Francisco Requires Poop Maps To Help Pedestrians Avoid ...](#)

For those who have maintained that San Francisco is full of . . . whatever, there is now living proof.

## **How much poop is there on the streets of the City by the Bay?**

<https://www.dailywire.com/news/12001/san-francisco-requires-poop-ma...>

### **San Francisco poop map: real thing or a rumor?**

Feb 28, 2018 · Of all the claims made by San Francisco's detractors, possibly the most puzzling to people who actually live in the Bay Area is the "poop map." "The city now offers people poop maps so they can avoid surprises," contends one online commenter on a recent story at this website about people ...



<https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/02/28/san-francisco-poop-map-real-th...>

### **San Francisco Set to Roll Out the 'Poop Patrol' to Clean Up ...**

It has a funny name, but it's targeting a serious problem. San Francisco is rolling out the 'PoopPatrol.'



<https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/San-Francisco-Set-to-Roll-Out-...>

### **Holy Crap: San Francisco To Deploy Poop Patrol To Clean Up ...**

Aug 15, 2018 · Holy Crap: San Francisco To Deploy Poop Patrol To Clean Up Feces That Are Apparently Everywhere - Matt Vespa: Well, we all know San Francisco is having problems.



<https://townhall.com/tipsheet/mattvespa/2018/08/15/holy-crap-s...>

### **Why is San Francisco ... covered in human feces? | Nathan ...**

Aug 18, 2018 · It's an empirical fact: San Francisco is a crappier place to live these days. Sightings of human feces on the sidewalks are now a regular occurrence; over the past 10 years, complaints about human waste have increased 400%.

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/aug/18/san-francisco-p...>

### **This Map Shows San Francisco Is Covered in Human Poop**

Citing human waste reports made in San Francisco, software engineer Jenn Wong mapped the city's most poop-ridden neighborhoods, and it is a feast for watery eyes.

<https://www.thrillist.com/news/nation/human-wasteland-map-plots-all...>

### **SF Mayor: 'There's More Feces ... Than I've Ever Seen' - NBC ...**

San Francisco Mayor London Breed believes homeless advocacy groups that receive funding from the city need to better educate the homeless to "clean up after themselves."



<https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/SF-Mayor-Theres-more-feces-on-...>

### **SF Mayor Says Her City Is Drowning In Poop: 'There's More ...**

San Francisco Mayor London Breed said the streets of her city are flooded with the excrement of the homeless in an interview Friday.

[dailycaller.com/2018/07/15/san-francisco-poop-problem/](https://dailycaller.com/2018/07/15/san-francisco-poop-problem/)

### **(Human) Wasteland - MochiMachine**

A map of human waste reports made to 311 in San Francisco! (Human) Wasteland; About; Year. 2008. ... (Human) Wasteland is a mochimachine ... San Francisco's Poop ...

[mochimachine.org/wasteland/](https://mochimachine.org/wasteland/)

### **It's no laughing matter — SF forming Poop Patrol to keep ...**

It sounds like silly elementary school banter, but it's real. San Francisco is about to launch the Poop Patrol. In about a month, ...

📄 <https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/heatherknight/article/It-s-no-lau...>

### **San Francisco CA plans poop patrol to clean sidewalks | The ...**

San Francisco plans a six-person poop patrol to clean up city sidewalks after receiving more than 14,000 complaints of feces since January. But the move sparked mockery and poop emojis aplenty on social media.

<https://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/article216722405.html>

### **San Fran-Poopsco**

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

### **San Francisco native man charged with sexually assaulting 99-year-old woman in SF Chinatown as Frisco crime spree worsens**

By [Evan Sernoffsky](#)

Security photos show a man suspected of sexually assaulting a woman in San Francisco's Chinatown on New Year's Eve.

A man captured after a New Year's Eve sex assault in San Francisco's Chinatown had attacked a 99-year-old woman in her apartment at the Ping Yuen housing project, officials said Wednesday.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

### **San Francisco train conductor reportedly warns riders to watch 'for needles' amid 'needle litter' epidemic in drug infested SF (foxnews.com)**

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

[Now San Francisco Wants To Ban Lunch \(downtrend.com\)](#)

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

[When people refuse to navigate piles of human shit to get food, San Francisco has the answer - BAN company owned cafeterias to "protect" local restaurants. \(m.washingtontimes.com\)](#)

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

### **San Francisco's Housing and Homeless Crises at "Boiling Point" Because Of Google-Twitter-Facebook Take-over of City Politicians**

Written by [James Murphy](#)

San Francisco is a city of contrasts. It boasts glorious views of the Golden Gate Bridge and the Pacific Ocean, and it also offers the [stench and disgusting sight](#) of piles of human feces on its sidewalks. It is a place filled with great wealth and striking poverty, with tech billionaires and Silicon Valley companies existing alongside an aggressive panhandling homeless population. While a city full of investors waits nervously on a new wave of initial public offerings (IPOs), drug users shoot up in the streets for anyone — be it tourists, businessmen, or schoolchildren — to see.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

### **SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA'S MEASURE 3 SEEKS TO CREATE "RAPE" BRIDGE TOOLS IN ORDER TO PUT CRONY CASH IN THE POCKETS OF JERRY BROWN'S FRIENDS**

- The Entire Measure 3 Plan Is A Scam To Help Google and Crony Insiders!

Posted by: [Zelda Bronstein](#)

On the June 5 ballot, Regional Measure 3 asks voters in nine Bay Area counties to approve a \$3 increase in tolls on all the region's bridges but the Golden Gate "to reduce auto and truck traffic, relieve crowding on BART, unclog freeway bottlenecks and improve bus, ferry, BART and commuter rail service." Its [supporters](#), who include the Bay Area Council, the Silicon Valley Leadership Group, SPUR, Facebook, and YIMBY Action, call it "a bold, coordinated, region-wide traffic relief plan."

RM3 is bold all right: it's an audacious con that dedicates \$4.5 billion to a hodgepodge of disconnected



projects that will bring the Bay Area little traffic relief.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

### **The San Francisco Bay Area Tech Mafia**

What They Have Been Proven To Be:

Misogynists, Frat Boys, Sexual Abusers, Rapists, Sexual Extortionists, Sexual Harassers, Intellectual Property Thieves, Copy-cats, Monopolists, Valuation Collusion-ists, Hooker Addicts, Trophy Wife Abusers, Tone Deaf Yuppies, Sociopaths, Closet Homosexuals, Elitist Boys Clubbers, Narcissists, Burning Man Orgy Pros, Drug Addicts, Alcoholics, Sex Addicts, Mobsters, Tax Cheats, Abusers, Real Estate Scammers, Liars, Racists, Anti-Trust Violators, Political Bribery Experts, Crony Political, Scam Operators, Election Rigging Financiers...

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

### **NEW SAN FRANCISCO MAYOR SAYS SF IS CONSUMED WITH CRAP**

[San Fran Mayor Laments Human Poop On Streets: 'More Than Ever Seen'...](#)

[CA DEMS REBUKE FEINSTEIN...](#)

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

[Clean up after yourselves: San Francisco mayor plans to ask homeless nicely not to poo in streets \(rt.com\)](#)

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

### **The San Francisco Archi-Tastrophe Coming Building Collapses**

- Greed and corruption put San Francisco in the current disaster movie scenario
- Over-building on un-stable ground in a small area subject to earthquakes should have been an obvious bad idea to anybody
- San Francisco City Hall chose to cram developer payola in their pockets and lies into the planning process

- Imagine a million tons of steel and concrete collapsing onto hundreds of thousands of commuters!
- One skyscraper will take down the next one in a 'domino effect'
- 18 buildings have started to fail but you have only heard about a handful of them...

### **The 39 San Francisco high-rises at risk of collapse during ...**

The analysis and testing of the structure were reviewed by the City and County of San Francisco Department of Building Inspection and Professor Ted Zsuttu PhD, an internationally recognized ...

<https://sf.curbed.com/2018/6/18/17465696/highrises-san-francisc...>

### **UPDATE: Buildings evacuated near construction site emergency ...**

Notice of a possible collapse of a 2,000 pound slab of concrete from the 30th floor of 33 Tehama Street prompted immediate evacuations of ten buildings in San Francisco's South of Market ...

[sfexaminer.com/evacuations-underway-near-construction-si...](https://sfexaminer.com/evacuations-underway-near-construction-si...)

### **At Risk in a Big Quake: 39 of San Francisco's Top High Rises**

Experts consider these buildings vulnerable to collapse only in extreme shaking caused by rare and powerful earthquakes, similar to the one that struck San Francisco in 1906.

 <https://nytimes.com/2018/06/14/us/california-earthquakes-high...>

### **Buildings safe to reenter surrounding San Francisco high-rise ...**

The building under construction initially prompted concerns that a 2,000 pound concrete wall could have collapsed. According to San Francisco Fire Department, the construction company made the ...

[foxnews.com/us/2017/02/15/evacuations-ordered-as-conc...](https://foxnews.com/us/2017/02/15/evacuations-ordered-as-conc...)

### **Booming San Francisco takes unprecedented step to target ...**

San Francisco's effort at publicizing a list of its buildings marks a new front in seismic safety — making it easier for residents and workers to easily understand the age of the city's ...

 [latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-san-francisco-tall-b...](https://latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-san-francisco-tall-b...)

### **Which SF High-Rises Could Collapse in an Earthquake**

The Transamerica Pyramid is among 39 San Francisco high-rise buildings that could collapse in an earthquake the magnitude of the 1906 quake, according to a new report the New York Times.

 [sfweekly.com/news/which-sf-high-rises-could-collapse-i...](https://sfweekly.com/news/which-sf-high-rises-could-collapse-i...)

### **Thirty nine San Francisco high rises at risk of collapse in ...**

Thirty-nine high rises in San Francisco are at risk of collapse in a major earthquake, according to a new

study by the U.S. Geological Service (USGS).. The vulnerable buildings (known as welded steel moment-frame buildings) were constructed by using a flawed technique to weld columns and beams together.

<https://bdcnetwork.com/thirty-nine-san-francisco-high-rises-risk...>

### **Who Will Pay for San Francisco's Tilting, Sinking Millennium ...**

The building, which opened in 2008 and was touted as the most luxurious tower in San Francisco, became a beacon of the city's burgeoning wealth, attracting tech millionaires, venture capitalists ...

**B**<https://bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-01/who>

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

### **The San Francisco ghosts in Kamala Harris past show that she knows how to \*\*ck**

by [Tiana Lowe](#)

Few outside of California know or care who Willie Brown is. But that may be about to change.

Brown spent around a quarter of a century as de facto royalty in California, first serving more than three decades as a member of the California Assembly (15 years as its speaker), and then eight years as mayor of San Francisco.

He also once carried out an open extramarital affair with a young prosecutor named Kamala Harris, currently a U.S. senator and leading contender for the Democratic presidential nomination.

Now, we're far beyond the point that a personal past like that disqualifies a candidate. Harris, after all, is vying to challenge a thrice-married man who once graced the cover of Playboy and publicized his infidelity on the cover of the New York Post. Candidates' personal lives no longer warrant deep investigation, unless they tell us something about their professional and political lives.

Unfortunately for Harris, the Willie Brown story is not strictly personal. It's also professional.

When Harris was barely 30, she began dating Brown, then in his 60s and speaker of the California Assembly. To be clear, an ambitious woman dating a powerful man is not alone any cause for concern. Strong women are attracted to success, and a 30-year-old assistant district attorney is hardly, say, a 21-year-old intern. But the story doesn't end there.

For one thing, Brown was [married](#) at the time. He wound up dumping Harris and returning to his wife as he became mayor. (Again, in the era of President Trump, few will clutch their pearls over this.)

More questionable than the romance is the relationship's apparent effect on her finances and her career. Brown, according to contemporary news accounts, gifted his then-girlfriend two government jobs with ample salaries — while she was just getting her start as an assistant DA.

As the San Francisco Weekly [reported](#) in 2003:

Aside from handing her an expensive BMW, Brown appointed her to two patronage positions in state government that paid handsomely — more than \$400,000 over five years. In 1994, she took a six-month leave of absence from her Alameda County job to join the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board. Brown then appointed her to the California Medical Assistance Commission, where she served until 1998, attending two meetings a month for a \$99,000 annual salary.

(That's more than \$150,000 in current dollars.)

Even after they broke up, Brown, a San Francisco kingmaker, continued to support Harris' career, boosting her district attorney run and years later [calling](#) on Antonio Villaraigosa to stay out of the Senate race, thus clearing the field for Harris.

Just two years into her tenure as senator, Harris now wants to reach the White House.

The facts are messy, but most in California politics are. If she earned few hundred thousand dollars in taxpayer-funded patronage thanks to a personal relationship, that undermines some of her good-government cred. Or at least it requires her to explain how she's changed.

Barack Obama wisely fessed up about his drug usage long before he was a presidential candidate, and he alluded to his personal growth and past mistakes enough that it created a satisfying narrative, one that couldn't be used against him. Donald Trump was a womanizer and a brash braggart, but that was his entire brand for more than two decades. The first real instance where his past came to haunt him was when he seemed to confess to sexual battery on the now-infamous Access Hollywood tape. The allegations of consensual affairs never really mattered.

Harris doesn't talk about Brown. She says that it's not relevant. But part of her prosecutorial persona is a posture of toughness on corruption. But the Willie Brown story, with those big paychecks, gives off at least a whiff of cronyism. She's got to address the charge she was profiting personally off connections to power — at least if she wants us to believe she actually stands [for the people](#).

#### \*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

### **Was San Francisco Mayor Ed Lee Poisoned, Using Untraceable Spy Technology, Because of His Immigration Scheme?**

- [Robert Mendick](#), chief reporter, [Hayley Dixon](#), [Victoria Ward](#), [Roland Oliphant](#)

Shell fish toxins, nut tree derivatives, umbrella launched cardiac gases and pocket-based electric pulse weapons can give any politician a "natural-looking heart-attack" that is man made. Many believe Andrew Brietbart and Google's Rajeev Motwani were killed this way for political retribution

A Russian agent convicted of spying for Britain was fighting for his life last night amid suspicions he was poisoned in a shopping centre in Wiltshire.

Sergei Skripal, 66, was in intensive care after being exposed to a mysterious substance as he sat on a

bench in the centre of Salisbury. A 33-year-old woman who was with him, is also in critical condition. Both had collapsed and were unconscious when they were discovered.

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**San Franciscan's Hate Google: Protesters toss scooters into street to block tech buses in SF**

By [Sarah Ravani](#)

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**THE DNC'S SAN FRANCISCO SEX CULT OFFERS CLITORAL TOUCHING FOR \$150.00**

We Went Under Cover With An iPhone In San Francisco And Marin County - The Dark Side of the Orgasmic Meditation Company. Almost every member is a registered Democrat and some are highly placed in the DNC. OneTaste is pushing its sexuality wellness education toward the mainstream. Some former members say it pushed them into sexual servitude and five-figure debts.

By Ellen Huet

When Michal got married in August 2015, her family and longtime friends didn't attend. The woman who walked her down the aisle, the dozens of beaming onlookers, her soon-to-be husband—all were people she'd met in the preceding 10 months. Wearing a loose, casual dress borrowed from one of her new friends, Michal spent the ceremony in a daze. She knew she didn't want to get married like this, in the living room of a rented San Francisco house without her family's support, yet she felt compelled to do it. That uneasy feeling could apply to most of her experiences in OneTaste. OneTaste is a sexuality-focused wellness education company based in the Bay Area. It's best known for classes on "orgasmic meditation," a trademarked procedure that typically involves a man using a gloved, lubricated fingertip to stroke a woman's clitoris for 15 minutes. For Michal, like those at her wedding, OneTaste was much more than a series of workshops. It was a company that had, in less than a year, gained sway over every aspect of her life....

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**If You're Going To San Francisco...Think Again**

By [Brian C. Joondeph](#)

A few decades ago, Scott McKenzie sang one of the classic hippie [anthems](#), "San Francisco," back in 1967. It was sung during the heyday of sex, drugs, and rock and roll. Flower power was the rage. Peace, love, and understanding were the mantras of the day, in response to the Viet Nam War and the oppression of The Man.

McKenzie sang, “If you're going to San Francisco, be sure to wear some flowers in your hair.” Back then, the flowers were for decoration, to match the tie-dyed clothing and sandals.

Flash forward fifty years, and residents of San Francisco may need to wear flowers, not only in their hair, but also covering their entire bodies. Not for decoration, however, but to mask the odor of a new feature of the streets of San Francisco.

### **Excrement.**

And it's been making the national news, a veritable emblem of what the city has become. The newly inaugurated San Francisco mayor is London Breed, who, as an aside, has a perfect 1960s name. Interviewed after her inauguration, the Daily Caller noted that she [observed](#) that the streets of her city “are flooded with the excrement of the homeless.”

In other words, San Francisco has become Poop City.

Apparently this is not a new problem. The famous chronicler of the city, San Francisco Chronicle columnist Herb Caen, occasionally would use the phrase in his daily screeds during the 1980s and 1990s, but it's far worse now. As the Daily Caller had the new mayor [noting](#): “There is more feces on the sidewalks than I’ve ever seen growing up here.” And not just poop. Added to the mix is a “dangerous mix of drug needles, garbage, and feces.”

Lovely. In 1967, “If you're going to San Francisco, you're gonna meet some gentle people there.” Now you will meet a garbage dump mixed with a cesspool.

San Francisco has about 7,500 homeless individuals and is [spending](#) \$280 million on homeless services for them. Some simple math reveals that the city could give each homeless resident just over \$37,000 per year, a figure well above the minimum wage in most other places, and call it a day.

If you take out the salaries of all the bureaucrats administering these “homeless services,” there would likely be more than \$100,000 available for each homeless person. But you know that won’t happen in a Democrat-run city, an administrative state, like San Francisco.

How can the city discourage the homeless from using the sidewalks as their toilets? In their minds, spend more money. The mayor [assured](#) her fellow progressives: “Harsher penalties for offenders are not on the table.” Instead the typical liberal solution, as the mayor promised, came to: “I work hard to make sure your programs are funded.” I wonder if we’ll see toilet paper dispensers popping up on the sidewalks?

This situation might seem to be a cross between funny and absurd, but it has economic consequences far beyond the necessary clean-up. Who might not be going to San Francisco because of the city’s pungent new attractions?

Start with conventions? San Francisco has always been a popular convention destination due to its fairly pleasant weather, its tourist attractions, its world-class restaurants, and of course, the cable cars. But in its current state, the bloom is off the San Francisco rose.

A major medical association recently cancelled its annual meeting which would have brought 15,000 attendees and \$40 million to the San Francisco economy, [according](#) to the SF Chronicle. This, after

many years of coming to the city. Think of that. A group of doctors, quite familiar with feces, needles, and the downtrodden, have said "enough."

These are things doctors can see in the medical ward and prefer to avoid when away from work, often with family, at a medical conference. It's likely that other trade groups and industries will stay away from San Francisco as well.

Can you blame them? How many U.S. cities provide visitors with a [public defecation map](#) to help tourists steer clear of piles of poop littering the city's sidewalks? Or which other city can boast of the 20-pound [bag of poop](#) found a few weeks ago on a city sidewalk?

How did things get this bad for the city that Tony Bennett left his heart in? When Tony recorded that song in the 1950s, San Francisco had a Republican mayor. Their last Republican mayor, George Christopher, [left office in 1964](#), when the Beatles arrived in America. Since then, it's been a hard day's night for San Francisco, with nearly sixty years' worth of Democrats running the show.

At a national level, San Francisco is represented by House minority leader Nancy Pelosi, Senator Dianne Feinstein, and Senator Kamala Harris, all of whom are hard-core liberals. I am quite confident that there are no piles of poop on the sidewalks in front of their homes.

San Francisco is just another of [many U.S. cities](#) run by Democrats, and into the ground. Even liberal film maker Michael Moore [observed](#) about his home city in Michigan: "Flint has voted for Dems for 84 straight yrs. What did it get us?"

San Francisco is left with virtue-signaling in the name of compassion, tolerance and all the other liberal claptrap in a bid to try to hide third world conditions on city streets. Aside from visitors choosing to go anywhere but San Francisco, what about the residents living in such conditions?

Warm summer temperatures and open sewers become a microbiology laboratory. Toss in a bunch of undernourished and unhealthy homeless persons, sharing hypodermic needles, and pestilence follows. Such a shame for a once-magnificent city.

Rather than cleaning up its mess, San Francisco has just this week [banned plastic straws](#). Poop and hypodermic syringes littering the sidewalks is just fine, but watch out for those nasty little plastic straws.

Once upon a time Scott McKenzie's words rang true, "For those who come to San Francisco, summertime will be a love-in there." Now it's simply America's version of a s\*\*\*hole.

***Brian C. Joondeph, MD, MPS, a Denver based physician and writer. Follow him on [Facebook](#), [LinkedIn](#) and [Twitter](#).***

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**[San Francisco Voters Choose Between a 1000 Percent Tax Increase and a 500 Percent Tax Increase- Nobody Wants To Be In San Francisco Any More \(reason.com\)](#)**



\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**The Bad Decision-Making Of The Drug Fried Minds Of The People That Live In San Francisco**

By Karma Harris

The social echo-chamber is a terrible thing.

Like drones, or robots or sheep, the mindless clones in San Francisco seem to be unable to see that they, in their cult-like quest for "individuality" are doing the exact same idiotic thing that every other San Franciscan is doing:

- Getting a giant eagle, crown or flower tattoo on their chest above their boobs
- Wearing a Fedora hat
- Growing a handle-bar mustache or stupid-looking Amish beard
- Making their clothes look like they accidentally exposed their look-at-me desperation tattoo
- Taking pictures of themselves making idiotic duck lips
- Wearing a plaid shirt
- Being obese and wearing a belly shirt
- Being obese and wearing a tube top
- Being obese and wearing Betty Boop make-up
- Thinking that heroin makes you look cool
- Study an "Art Career" at a commercial "Institute" your rich sucker parents pay you to smoke pot at
- Being a grown-up who uses a skate-board or push scooter
- Wearing a spandex T-Shirt and pursing your lips because you want to be gay and "with it"
- Using the phrase "sociability nexus" or any other Tech BS-speak
- Worshiping Google
- Wearing all black at night because nobody else thought of that
- Thinking that your "pot cafe" idea is original, unique and will last more than 3 months
- Paying tens times more for food because it has tofu hidden in it
- Blindly mouthing any party line pretext that Nancy Pelosi tells them to
- Getting scabies every weekend at the 1050 Folsom night-club
- Tweeting as if anything you do matters to anybody

Page 77 - EXHIBIT 83 – Case # 22-cv-1107-TSH, Norcal 9th District.pdf

- Hiding your mental illness by saying and dressing "gender fluid"-like
- Getting a pack of tattoos that proudly announce your bad decision making
- Getting a pack of tattoos that proudly announce you are a slut
- Owning a fluorescent colored bicycle
- Not seeing Willie Brown and his side-mistress Sonia hanging out at the "W"
- Creating a start-up that sells nothing that anybody actually needs or wants but has an ironic name
- Talking about "Burning Man" with any other sense than shame
- Going to a "TED Conference" without realizing you are a douche bag
- Using Match.com to get free dinners
- Having no ability whatsoever to consider the consequences of your actions
- Not seeing that the SF Board of Supes are all elitist stock market inside traders abusing the City
- Having six room-mates
- Pooping in the street because you embrace the "multi-cultural experience"
- Having no clue how the real world works
- Being a woman at Stanford University without knowing the Frats just see you as a baby oven
- Being a white yuppie guy with a Chinese girlfriend who doesn't not realize what the real deal is
- Not knowing why you feel you NEED to go to Starbucks

\*\*\*\*\* SAN FRANCISCO HELL-SCAPE \*\*\*\*\*

**We could go on and post tens of thousands of additional news articles about what a disgusting shit-hole San Francisco has been turned into by it's own corruption but... you get the point!**

## SILICON VALLEY'S LIES ABOUT ITSELF

When any PR person first gets in the job at Tesla they think "Yahooo, Big Bucks!", then when they read the hundreds of charges against Tesla, they head for the door. Per crime reports such as:

[https://newsplus007.com/public/The Capital Hill Omerta.pdf](https://newsplus007.com/public/The_Capital_Hill_Omerta.pdf) and federal investigations, it is a wonder that anyone who is sane would work at Tesla Motors!



Tesla has dissolved its PR department — technically becoming the first automaker who doesn't talk to the press.

It's something that we have [discussed on our podcast several times over the last few months](#), but now that [reporters are publicly complaining about it](#), we thought we'd clear things up in an article.

Tesla hasn't responded to a press inquiry in months. We have received the odd email here and there from former press people, but it almost seems to be in an unofficial capacity.

If you're a reporter who isn't getting a response from Tesla, don't take it personally, because it's due to the automaker having dissolved its PR team.

The move has been confirmed to *Electrek* at the highest level at Tesla with the source saying, "We no longer have a PR Team."

[Keely Sulprizio](#), the last person known to officially be in charge of PR/communications at Tesla, left the automaker in December of last year to join Impossible Foods. Following her departure, virtually every other member of Tesla's PR team either left or moved to other positions at Tesla.

After Sulprizio, [Alan Cooper](#) was the most senior member of Tesla's communications team, and in February, his role was changed to director of demand generation, but he has now apparently left the company.

[Gina Antonini](#), a senior manager on Tesla's comms team for three years, saw her role changed to director of external relations and employee experience at Tesla in February.

Also in February, Tesla communications manager [Alexander Ingram](#) moved to a role as content lead for Design Studio at Tesla.

[Danielle Meister](#), senior global communications manager at Tesla, left for WhatsApp in April.

Most recently, Rich Otto, who handled some of the latest PR projects at Tesla like exclusive videos with YouTubers and Jay Leno, is now a product manager, according to his [LinkedIn profile](#).

The core global team working out of the US has been dissolved. There are obviously still people arranging test-drive promotions for YouTubers but their role isn't in a traditional public relations capacity.

I don't like the message it sends to not respond to any press inquiry. Are they all valid? Of course not. But there are some legitimate questions that the press sends to Tesla — and the public, most importantly, would benefit from answers.

Ignoring the press, and thus the public and customers, which is basically what is happening without a PR department, is only adding to something that most Tesla owners would probably agree was already one of Tesla's biggest weaknesses: communication.

Tesla PR is just the "Tesla Department of Lying". They are hired to cover up the many sins at Tesla Motors. Elon Musk uses services like Cambridge Analytica and Google to hide the truth and push the lies forward.

Musk uses his PR to hype his smoke screen "Mars Program". He does not want you to realize that his actual pitch for the Mars scam is: *"Hey! You Can Be Trapped In A Tin Can For Years With Elon Musk's Asshole Douche Bag Friends And Then Die A Horrible Death From Radiation"*. The whole Mars thing is a cover-up to hide the fact that the only thing that SpaceX does is launch domestic spy satellites that spy on consumers communications in order to control their politics. Also being hidden: The fact that SpaceX ships blow up constantly.

Recently, SpaceX's [Elon Musk](#) addressed the Humans to Mars conference, during which he waxed eloquent with BS hype about how his Starship interplanetary spacecraft was proceeding along. It is no secret that Musk is building this monster spaceship to facilitate his long-held dream to establish a settlement on the planet Mars. [CNBC reports](#) that Musk has a cautionary note for people who might want to join in on the project.

"I want to emphasize that this is a very hard and dangerous, difficult thing, not for the faint of heart. Good chance you'll die, it's going to be tough going, but it will be pretty glorious if it works out."

Death or glory or maybe both. Those are the choices that Musk is offering prospective future Mars settlers. With the Starship's development proceeding apace in Boca Chica, Texas, that choice may be available to a lot of people sooner than most think. You too can buy into this sociopath's egotistical madness.

Humans who visit Mars can [die](#) in a wide variety of awful ways. Radiation, lack of a breathable atmosphere and extreme cold are just a few of the conditions that can shorten a life or kill you from starvation, water system failure, un-diagnosed COVID, burning alive during descent and thousands of other things.

The effects of low gravity on humans' long-term health are not well understood. While, thanks to the International Space Station, we know a lot about what microgravity does to the human body, the longest time anyone has spent in a low-gravity environment was three days during the last few Apollo

missions.

The psychological effects of living long term in a hostile environment are little understood but must be considered. [One study](#) of the mental health issues of researchers living at an Antarctic base suggests that depression, anxiety, cognitive impairment and irritability can result. Indeed, all of Musk's Musktronauts could go as nuts as Musk and kill each other. People who stay at the bottom of the world are a few hours' plane trip to New Zealand. People who move to Mars will be 100 million miles from the home where they grew up and to which they will be unlikely to ever return. They will be permanently bummed out.

If all of the above gives the reader pause, perhaps he or she is not cut out to be in the first generation of Martians.

Musk does not seem willing to go. He wants you to take the risks while he stays here on Earth to hype his image PR.

Why would anyone want to leave a world of green hills and blue, flowing water for one that features frigid, arid deserts blasted by radiation with no surface water or breathable air? Mars is a shit-hole empty desert of nothingness that is about as boring as Fremont, California. If all the other stuff does not kill you, the boredom certainly will. Do you have a favorite food? You will never see that again. If the plants on your spaceship all die, you will have to eat your own shit: Fun! If only Musk would try that...

Musk's constant dope smoking has him unable to that his little band of Martian nutballs will become increasingly bureaucratic and, like all societies, become people who would just as soon break your head open rather than peacefully debate political issues if they disagree with you. Being trapped in a tin can does that to people even worse than in ordinary culture.

Can a Mars settlement be a freer society than we enjoy on Earth, even considering the need for everyone to be focused on sheer survival? Not likely. But one thing is certain, if Elon Musk is one of the settlers, he will have to step back from power and resist the temptation to be a benevolent dictator. Good luck with that Musktronauts!

The vast number of forms of radiation, starvation and boredom are calling Elon. We hope Musk climbs on the first spaceship and that his self-aggrandizing, narcissistic, political bribery self is never seen again.

Musk controls more than the PR for his Cartel. He controls the stock market around his Cartel.

[Tesla](#) shares may be up 400% this year, but one investment researcher is sounding the alarm on the stock.

New Constructs CEO David Trainer calls Tesla the most dangerous stock on Wall Street and says the fundamentals do not support such a high price and valuation.

“Whatever best-case scenario you want to paint for what Tesla’s going to do – whether they’re going to produce 30 million cars within the next 10 years, and get in the insurance business and have the same high margins as Toyota, the most efficient car company with scale of all-time – even if you do believe all that is true, the stock price is still implying that profits are going to be even bigger than

that,” Trainer told CNBC’s “[Trading Nation](#)” on Thursday.

He notes that the stock price is implying anywhere from a 40% to 110% market share based upon the average selling price. At its current average selling price of \$57,000 and assuming 10.9 million car sales by 2030, that implies 42% market share, Trainer says. Tesla trades at 159 times forward earnings.

“We think this is a big, big – one of the biggest of all time – houses of cards that’s getting ready to fold,” said Trainer.

He adds that its recent stock split could also prove dangerous to new investors getting into the stock.

“Stock splits are inconsequential to value. They’re not changing the size, they’re just dividing it up into more pieces. Honestly, I look at the stock split as a way to lure more unsuspecting, less sophisticated traders into just trying to chase this stock up and that is not a real strategy,” said Trainer.

[Tesla split its stock five to one on August 31](#) – shares rallied 12% on the session. However, the stock ended last week down more than 5% after the company’s [largest outside shareholder Ballie Gifford trimmed its stake](#). The stock was also caught up in a broader sell-off that punished some of the market’s high momentum names.


A more realistic valuation, says Trainer, would be far lower than current levels.

“I think around a 10th of what it is is probably appropriate if you look at, you know, kind of a reasonable level of profits,” he said. “Tesla doesn’t rank in the top 10 in market share or car sales in Europe for EVs and that’s because the laws changed in Europe that have strongly incentivized the incumbent manufacturers to crank up hybrids and electric vehicles. The same is coming in the United States. I think realistically we’re talking about something closer to \$50, not \$500, as a real value.”

A focus on fundamentals, though, makes Tesla a no-touch for him.

Tesla did not respond to a request for comment, but these articles tell all:

[The federal agency that sued Elon Musk for fraud ...](#)

 <https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/sec-questioned-tesla-accounting-redactions-elon-musk-fraud-lawsuit-2019-11-1028723909?op=1>

The agency sued **Musk** for fraud in the fall of 2018 after he tweeted that he was thinking about taking Tesla private at \$420 a share and had "funding secured," then added "investor support is ...

[Elon Musk Tesla Motors SCAM dissected SEC must Intervene ...](#)

 <https://aitradingbot.app/2016/07/14/elon-musk-tesla-motors-scam-dissected-sec-must-intervene/>

[vc\_row][vc\_column][vc\_column\_text]Elon **Musk** Tesla Motors **SCAM** dissected SEC must Intervene. It is true, that **Elon Musk** is considered by many, the crowd, a true visionary, but in our view, he is just an individual destroying taxpayers good money with \$4.9 billion in government support.. NEWS: Sell SolarCity **SCAM** Ahead of the Collapse According to the Times, Tesla alone received \$2.3 billion ...

**Elon Musk Gets Embroiled in Crypto Scam That Offers Tesla ...**

 <https://u.today/elon-musk-gets-embroiled-in-crypto-scam-that-offers-tesla-model-s>

British newspaper Daily Express reports that Tesla and SpaceX boss **Elon Musk** has been involved in a slew of crypto **scams** that are still prevalent on Twitter despite all the efforts to crack down on them. Scammers impersonate **Musk** in order to cajole gullible victims into sending their Bitcoin and Ethereum holdings.

**Elon Musk made a \$6 billion mistake when he bought ...**

 <https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/elon-musk-made-6-billion-error-buying-solarcity-tesla-stock-2020-2-1028886284?op=1>

When **Elon Musk** acquired SolarCity in the fall of 2016, he paid for it using Tesla **stock** worth \$2.6 billion at the time. Those shares are worth \$8.4 billion today. Tesla's CEO gave 0.110 Tesla ..

You need to know:


**How Elon Musk And His Silicon Valley Insiders Control The Stock Market With Manipulation Computers And How It Is All Rigged Against YOU!**

The SEC has released a report that shows how you, as an individual, are utterly, totally, hopelessly now unable to do anything in the stock market. Unless you control tens of millions of dollars of servers and have 1000 private insiders at Goldman Sachs rigging the market with automatted computer processing systems, you mean nothing:

**How Elon Musk And His Silicon Valley Insiders Control The Stock Market.pdf**

Elon Musk didn't MAKE any of his money. He STOLE it by having his Goldman Sachs A Draper Fisher Cartel rig the stock market. This data from the SEC proves that the stock markets should no longer exist and they are the root cause of corruption in the world

**Central banks are creating 'fake markets,' Bank of America ...**


 <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/22/central-banks-are-creating-fake-markets-bank-of-america-strategists-say.html>

May 22, 2020 Central banks are creating '**fake markets**,' Bank of America strategists say. Published Fri, May 22 2020 8:53 AM EDT. Elliot Smith @ElliotSmithCNBC. ... **Stock** Quotes, and **Market** Data





**These are the 6 reasons stocks are 'divorced from reality ...**

 <https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/6-reasons-stock-market-divorced-from-reality-bank-of-america-2020-5-1029227416?op=1>

Lucas Jackson/Reuters. In a note on Thursday, Michael Hartnett, Bank of America's chief investment strategist, outlined six reasons the **stock market** has continued to rally amid dismal economic data.

**Investors, prepare for a fake-out rally in the stock market**

 <https://www.marketwatch.com/story/investors-prepare-for-a-fake-out-rally-in-the-stock-market-2019-01-07>

Outside the Box Opinion: Investors, prepare for a **fake-out** rally in the **stock market** Published: Jan. 7, 2019 at 11:09 a.m. ET

**Experts WARN Of Another IMMINENT Stock Market CRASH ...**

 <https://www.silverdoctors.com/headlines/world-news/experts-warn-of-another-imminent-stock-market-crash-this-will-not-end-well/>

So why would the **stock market** be going up? It's simple. The Federal Reserve is throwing money at it causing temporary deflation and long term inflation while making the **stock market** look bullish. In reality it's **all fake**. It is propping up an already existing bubble massively and it is bound to lead to an epic collapse.

**Is The Stock Market Rigged? - Investopedia**

 <https://www.investopedia.com/articles/stocks/10/stock-market-rigged.asp>

The **stock market** is technically not rigged for the average investor. Laws and governing bodies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exist to "level the playing field" for everyday ...

**Forget fake news, investors should realize the markets are ...**

 <https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/28/forget-fake-news-investors-should-realize-the-markets-are-fake-says-asset-manager.html>

Jun 28, 2017 When Filia was asked to explain how his '**fake markets**' theory stacked up with declining global **stocks** on Wednesday, he replied, "A pullback of 1 percent in the **stock market** from **all-time** highs? I ...

**Is the U.S. stock market rigged? - CBS News**

 <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/is-the-us-stock-market-rigged/>

The United States **stock market**, the most iconic **market** in global capitalism is rigged." Michael Lewis is not talking about the **stock market** that you see on television every day.

**Is StockX Legit? Or do they sell fakes? (Here are the ...**

 <https://blog.wallstreetsurvivor.com/2018/11/06/is-stockx-legit/>

There is one **stock market** educational newsletter that is written for beginner to intermediate investors that also happens to have the best **stock** recommendations. This one service has an amazing average return of 143.44% on **ALL** of their **stock** picks the last 4 years.

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You may not have the right kind of education, technical savvy or psychology PhD to understand how this is possible but you know that Silicon Valley is doing something very, very bad to you..right?

[Michael Wade](#) reveals that the dealings that have been revealed between Cambridge Analytica and Facebook have all the trappings of a Hollywood thriller: a Bond villain-style CEO, a reclusive billionaire, a naive and conflicted whistle-blower, a hipster data scientist turned politico, an academic with seemingly questionable ethics, and of course a triumphant president and his influential family. Facebook, Google and Netflix executives and venture capitalists set out to use their data to push their ideology and politics on the world using psychological tricks embedded in their media. You, and Congress, are not smart enough to see how they are doing it. The cow at the meat processing plant is not smart enough to see that, at the end of the week, a metal rod will be shot into his skull and he will be gutted. The public and the cow are both being harvested. One for their privacy, the other for their meat.



The public still buys devices with microphones and cameras on them. The public still uses sites and programs that you have to "log in" to so that you can be data-harvested. Cows can't read newspapers so they can be excused for not knowing that millions of cows before them were chopped up. The news tells the humans that all of the products of Silicon Valley spy on, and abuse them, yet the humans still keep using those products and buying those phones that are just glorified listening devices. One could argue that the humans are dumber than the cows because the humans seem to be incapable of considering the consequences of their digital actions even after being warned.

Much of the discussion has been on how Cambridge Analytica was able to obtain data on more than 50 million Facebook users – and how it allegedly failed to delete this data when told to do so. But there is also the matter of what Cambridge Analytica actually did with the data. In fact the data crunching

company's approach represents a step change in how analytics can today be used as a tool to generate insights – and to exert influence. They proved that Facebook has a file on every American.

For example, pollsters have long used segmentation to target particular groups of voters, such as through categorizing audiences by gender, age, income, education and family size. Segments can also be created around political affiliation or purchase preferences. The data analytics machine that presidential candidate Hillary Clinton used in her 2016 campaign – named "Ada" to target groups of eligible voters in the same way that Barack Obama had done 4 years previously. In fact Google and Facebook manipulated culture, the internet and elections and pretty much, **alone**, illicitly put Obama in the White House in exchange for Quid Pro Quo.

Cambridge Analytica was contracted to the Trump campaign and provided an entirely new weapon for the election machine. While it also used demographic segments to identify groups of voters, as Clinton's campaign had, Cambridge Analytica also segmented using [psychographics](#). As definitions of class, education, employment, age and so on, demographics are informational. Psychographics are behavioral – a means to segment by personality.

Huge numbers of kids have committed suicide because of posts on Facebook. This is widely reported. What is not widely reported is that huge numbers of adults have committed suicide because of organized attacks on them operated by Media Matters, Fusion GPS and hundreds of other hired political attack services.

This makes a lot of sense. It's obvious that two people with the same demographic profile (for example, white, middle-aged, employed, married men) can have markedly different personalities and opinions. We also know that adapting a message to a person's personality – whether they are open, introverted, argumentative, and so on – goes a long way to help getting that message across and/or to control the intent of others.

### **Understanding people better for better election manipulation**

Eric Schmidt, David Drummond, Larry Page, Mark Zuckerberg, Kent Walker, and the other Facebook/Google oligarchs, are clinical sociopaths. The feds never arrest them, the fines against them are meaningless, corrupt U. S. Senators protect them, they have Jeffrey Epsteinian hookers-on-demand...there is no reason for them to end their crimes and every incentive for them to double-down on their machinations. They are above the law!

Traditionally, there have been two routes to ascertaining someone's personality. You can either get to know them really well – usually over an extended time. Or you can get them to take a personality test and ask them to share it with you. Neither of these methods is realistically open to pollsters. Cambridge Analytica found a third way, with the assistance of two University of Cambridge academics.

The first, Aleksandr Kogan, sold them access to 270,000 personality tests completed by Facebook users [through an online app he had created](#) for research purposes. Providing the data to Cambridge Analytica was, it seems, against Facebook's internal code of conduct (except if it pushes ideologies Zuckerberg wants), but only in March 2018 has Kogan been "banned" by Facebook from the platform. In addition, Kogan's data also came with a bonus: he had reportedly collected Facebook data from the test-takers' friends – and, at an average of 200 friends per person, that added up to some 50 million people.

However, these 50 million people had not all taken personality tests. This is where the second Cambridge academic, [Michal Kosinski](#), came in. Kosinski – who is said to believe that micro-targeting based on online data could strengthen democracy – had figured out a way to [reverse engineer a personality profile from Facebook activity](#) such as likes. Whether you choose to like pictures of sunsets, puppies, or people apparently says a lot about your personality. So much, in fact, that on the basis of 300 likes, Kosinski's model is able to predict someone's personality profile [with the same accuracy as a spouse](#).

Kogan developed Kosinski's ideas, improved them, and cut a deal with Cambridge Analytica. Armed with this bounty – and combined with additional data gleaned from elsewhere – Cambridge Analytica built personality profiles for more than 100 million registered US voters. It's claimed the company then used these profiles for targeted advertising.

Imagine for example that you could identify a segment of voters that is high in conscientiousness and neuroticism, and another segment that is high in extroversion but low in openness. Clearly, people in each segment would respond differently to the same political ad. But on Facebook they do not need to see the same ad at all – each will see an individually tailored ad designed to elicit the desired response, whether that is voting for a candidate, not voting for a candidate, or donating funds. Google does this every minute of every day, to influence politics, because they get away with it with ease.

Cambridge Analytica worked hard to develop dozens of ad variations on different political themes such as immigration, the economy, and gun rights, all tailored to trick different personality profiles.

Behavioral analytics and psychographic profiling are here to stay, no matter what becomes of Cambridge Analytica. This digital data rape industrializes what salespeople have always done but in the most sinister and evil way possible, by adjusting their message and delivery to the personality of their customers. This approach to electioneering – and indeed to marketing – will be Cambridge Analytica's ultimate legacy of darkness.

**REMEMBER: Poison your data by always lying in online forms, use fake names and fake email addresses online, NEVER put your real address, city, phone, birth date or ANY other identifiable data online. Deny the Silicon Valley Cartel ANY ability to abuse your data or to use you for election manipulation!**

## ADDITIONAL LINKS, EVIDENCE, BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES

Note: The “*ADDITIONAL LINKS, EVIDENCE, BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES*” of all of these volumes, taken together, comprise the total. It would add too many pages to each set to include all of the same sets of links in each volume. Assume that the references addendum's work cumulatively.

<http://silicon-valley-mobsters.com>

The feature film: *Assholes: A Theory*: <https://www.imdb.com/title/tt10011682/>



Every Tech CEO And Investor In Silicon Valley Is A Predatory, Parasitic, Sex Trafficking, Misogynist, Money Laundering, Politician Bribing, Exclusionary, Black-Listing Criminal [Why Silicon Valley has a bro culture problem — and how to ...](#)

[Vhttps://www.vox.com/2018/2/5/16972096/emily-chang-brotopia-book-bloomberg-technology-culture-silicon-valley-kara-swisher-decode-podcast](https://www.vox.com/2018/2/5/16972096/emily-chang-brotopia-book-bloomberg-technology-culture-silicon-valley-kara-swisher-decode-podcast)

When **Emily Chang** interviewed venture capitalist Michael Moritz in 2015, she wasn't trying to "trap" him. But when the Sequoia Capital then-chairman suggested that hiring more women might ...

[The Universal Bro Code: The Bro Code Rules](#)

[□https://valenciabrocode.blogspot.com/p/bro-code-rules.html](https://valenciabrocode.blogspot.com/p/bro-code-rules.html)

The **Bro Code Rules** The **Bro Code** 1) You must always have your **bro's** back. No exceptions. 2) When your **bro's** girlfriend inquires about his whereabouts you know nothing, always. 3) You are only obligated to wingman for one **bro** per social event, after that the **bro** is on his own.

[Emily Chang on the 'Brotopia' of Silicon Valley, and how ...](#)

 <https://www.geekwire.com/2018/emily-chang-brotopia-silicon-valley-companies-can-tackle-toxic-culture/>

**Emily Chang:** Brotopia, in my mind, perfectly encapsulates this idea of **Silicon Valley** as a modern utopia where anyone can change the world, make their own rules — if they're a man. But if you ...

["Oh My God, This Is So F---ed Up": Inside \*\*Silicon Valley's\*\* ...](#)

 <https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/01/brotopia-silicon-valley-secretive-orgiastic-inner-sanctum>

Adapted from Brotopia: Breaking Up the Boys' Club of **Silicon Valley**, by **Emily Chang**, to be published on February 6, 2018, by Portfolio, an imprint of Penguin Publishing Group, a division of ...

[Today's Tech Oligarchs Are Worse Than the \*\*Robber Barons\*\*](#)

 <https://www.thedailybeast.com/todays-tech-oligarchs-are-worse-than-the-robber-barons>

Today's Tech Oligarchs Are Worse Than the **Robber Barons**. Our **Silicon Valley Robber Barons**. ...  
"If you think **Silicon Valley** is going to fuel growing prosperity, you are likely to be ...

[Silicon Valley Billionaires Are the New \*\*Robber Barons\*\*](#)

 <https://townhall.com/columnists/victordavishanson/2017/08/17/silicon-valley-billionaires-are-the-new-robber-barons-n2369394>

Aug 17, 2017**Silicon Valley** Billionaires Are the New **Robber Barons** ... **Silicon Valley** Billionaires Are the New **Robber Barons**. Victor Davis Hanson ... Yet most of the computers and smartphones sold by **Silicon** ...

[Hanson: \*\*Silicon Valley\*\* billionaires are modern \*\*robber barons\*\*](#)

 <https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/08/17/hanson-silicon-valley-billionaires-are-the-new-robber-barons/>

Aug 17, 2017Hanson: **Silicon Valley** billionaires are the new **robber barons** ... Yet most of the computers and smartphones sold by **Silicon Valley** companies are still being built abroad — to mostly silence from ...

[Brotopia: Breaking Up the Boys' Club of \*\*Silicon Valley\*\* by ...](#)

 <https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/36288143-brotopia>

Brotopia by **Emily Chang** is a decent, but very surface level, examination of **Silicon Valleys** misogynist culture. Considering the significance of the topic, Brotopia feels like a missed opportunity to expose and critique the tech industry in a productive way; instead, I felt that only summaries were given on most topics.

[Silicon Valley's Giants Are Just Gilded Age Tycoons in ...](#)

 <https://www.thedailybeast.com/silicon-valleys-giants-are-just-gilded-age-tycoons-in-techno-utopian-clothes>




**Silicon Valley's** Giants Are Just Gilded Age Tycoons in Techno-Utopian Clothes . ... but the truth is they are a lot like the old **robber barons**. ... **Silicon Valley** executives were not just about ...

[The anonymous \*\*Silicon Valley\*\* satire that has stumped tech ...](#)

 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/12/02/the-anonymous-silicon-valley-satire-that-has-stumped-tech-world-insiders/>


Dec 2, 2015The plot follows **Crooks**, an ex-**tech** industry employee who finds spiritual deliverance in meditating on **Silicon Valley's** philosophies far, far away from the digital mecca itself. AD One passage ...

[Silicon Valley Wants To Read Your Mind - \*\*Crooks\*\* and Liars](#)

 <https://crooksandliars.com/2019/09/silicon-valley-wants-read-your>

But **Silicon Valley** should not be able to dictate the way these technologies are developed and deployed. If they do, it may radically reshape the way we identify as human. Garfield Benjamin, Postdoctoral Researcher, School of Media Arts and Technology, Solent University. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons ...

[Silicon Valley's cocaine problem shaped our racist tech ...](#)

 <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jan/30/silicon-valleys-cocaine-problem-shaped-our-racist-tech>

Jan 30, 2020**Silicon Valley** in the 1980s was the hub of an international drug trafficking network that fueled technological innovation and criminalized black people Charlton D McIlwain Thu 30 Jan 2020 06.00 ...

[Sex Scandal Toppled a \*\*Silicon Valley\*\* Chief. Investors Say ...](#)

 <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/27/technology/sexual-misconduct-silicon-valley.html>

Jul 27, 2018**Sex Scandal** Toppled a **Silicon Valley** Chief. Investors Say, So What? Mike Cagney was ousted as chief executive of Social Finance last year after questions about sexual misconduct. He has since ...

[Week in Tech: Sex Scandals and \*\*Silicon\*\* ...](#)

 <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/01/technology/farhad-and-mikes-week-in-tech-sex-scandals-and-silicon-valley.html>

Dec 1, 2017**Silicon Valley's Sex Scandals**. Farhad: O.K., let's talk about the tech industry.Let's start with this week's episode of Problematic Men. A report by The Information found that Andy Rubin ...

[The history of sexual harassment scandals in \*\*Silicon\*\* ...](#)

 <https://www.businessinsider.com/sexual-harassment-scandals-tech-industry-2017-7?op=1>



Here is a rundown of the current sexual harassment **scandals** rocking **Silicon Valley**, along with the long history of how the tech industry got here. ... 07/16/how-silicon-valley-silences-sexual ...

[Silicon Valley Star Lands New Job a Month After Sex Scandal](#)

 <https://www.wired.com/2013/02/keith-rabois-khosla-ventures/>

A little more than one month after a sexual harassment **scandal** threatened to sink a **Silicon Valley** superangel, Keith Rabois has landed a new gig that puts him not too far from his old one.. A ...

[Silicon Valley's Not-So-Hidden Secret: Sex Parties](#)

 <https://www.newser.com/story/253597/silicon-valleys-not-so-hidden-secret-sex-parties.html>

**Silicon Valley's** Not-So-Hidden Secret: **Sex** Parties ... "These **sex** parties happen so often among the premier V.C. and founder crowd that this isn't a **scandal** or even really a secret, I've been ...

[Scandal cost Silicon Valley Community Foundation \\$1.5 M](#)

 <https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/01/17/silicon-valley-community-foundation-reveals-price-of-ousting-toxic-leadership/>

Jan 17, 2020The leaders ousted for fostering a toxic workplace at the **Silicon Valley** Community Foundation walked away with tens of thousands of dollars in severance pay, tax filings show, revealing the cost ...

["Oh My God, This Is So F---ed Up": Inside Silicon Valley's ...](#)

 <https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/01/brotopia-silicon-valley-secretive-orgiastic-inner-sanctum>

Some of the most powerful men in **Silicon Valley** are regulars at exclusive, drug-fueled, **sex**-laced parties—gatherings they describe not as scandalous, or even secret, but as a bold ...

[Sexual harassment in Silicon Valley: have we reached a ...](#)

 <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/09/silicon-valley-sexual-harassment-women-speak-up>

Jul 9, 2017The last week has seen women in **Silicon Valley** share stories of sexual harassment, assault and discrimination, prompting a backlash and high-profile resignations.

[The big lesson Silicon Valley can learn from the Theranos ...](#)

 <https://fortune.com/2018/03/15/elizabeth-holmes-theranos-fraud-secrecy/>

Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes and former president Ramesh "Sunny" Balwani were charged with an "elaborate, years-long fraud."

The public records of Silicon Valley operatives: David Krane, Brian Bendett, Brendan Bulik-Sullivan, Terri Burns, Blake Byers, Tim Draper, Steve Jurvetson, Elon Musk, Steve Westly, Steve Spinner, Tyson Clark, Frederique Dame, Tom Perkins, Scott Davis, Reid Hoffman, Eric Schmidt, Larry Page, Jared Cohen, David Drummond, Karim Faris, Tom Hulme, Joe Kraus, John Lyman, Vinod Khosla, Laura

Melahn, Dave Munichello, Erik Nordlander, Anthony Philippakis, Sridhar Ramaswamy, David Reshef, Ben Robbins, Issi Rozen, David Schenkein, Vidu Shanmugarajah, M.G. Siegler, Graham Spencer, Bethany Tsui, Jessica Verrilli, Andy Wheeler, Krishna Yeshwant, Asheem Chandna, Jerry Chen, Mike Duboe, Sarah Guo, Christine Kim, Josh McFarland, Saam Motamedi, Sridhar Ramaswamy, Corinne Riley, Jason Risch, Seth Rosenberg, David Sze, David Thacker, David Wadhwani, Manuel Bernal, Allie Dalglish, Don Sullivan, Yasmin Green, Kent Walker, Matt Rogers, Steven Chu, David Plouffe, Sergy Brin, Andy Rubin, Ian Fette, Travis Kalanick, Elizabeth Holmes, Dustin Moskovitz, Laurene Powell Jobs, Andy Bechtolsheim, Brian Goncher, Cheryl Sandberg, Gilman Louie, Ira Ehrenpreis, Tim Cook, James Breyer, Joe Lonsdale, Keith Rabois, Marc Andreessen, George Soros, Mario Rosatti, Martin LaGod, Michael Moritz, Viktor Vekselberg, Larry Summers, Pierre Omidyar, Tom Steyer, RoseAnn Rotando, Larry Birenbaum, Judy Estrin, Steven Goldby, Terry Kramer, Helen Raiser, John Scully, Sandi Thompson, Ann Wojcicki and their ilk...

The perpetrators operate a **massive and abusive national sex scheme**. [The perverts](#) in the SandHill Road Venture Capital offices, located between Highway 280 down to Santa Cruz Avenue on Sand Hill Road in Menlo Park, California, are the main perpetrators of this global cartel.

<https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/01/brotopia-silicon-valley-secretive-orgiastic-inner-sanctum>

Their executives at Google, Facebook, Netflix, Linkedin, Twitter, and their related holdings, comprise the rest. The Harvey Weinstein and [Ed Buck](#) sex scandals are well known.

<https://ktla.com/2019/09/17/dem-donor-ed-buck-arrested-after-3rd-mans-overdose-charged-with-operating-west-hollywood-drug-house/>

These [sex cult actions](#) have been widely covered in the news individually, ie:

- The [Joe Lonsdale rape case](#)

( <https://europetodaynews.wordpress.com/2017/04/28/joe-lonsdale-rapist-abusive-frat-boy-and-mysoginst-or-gods-gift-to-women/> )

- [The Kleiner Perkins Ellen Pao sex abuse lawsuit](#)

( <https://www.eandblaw.com/employment-discrimination-blog/2016/02/19/pao-v-kleiner-perkins/> )

- The [Eric Schmidt sex penthouse stories](#)

( <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2377785/Google-CEO-serial-womanizer-Eric-Schmidt-spends-15-million-dollars-private-doorman-Manhattan-penthouse-totally-soundproofed.html> )

- [The Jeffrey Epstein case](#)

( <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/article220097825.html> )

- The [Google Forrest Hayes hooker murder case](#)

( <https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/07/09/google-exec-hayes-killed-by-call-girl/12422797/> )

- **The Google [Andy Rubin sex slave case](#)**

( <https://conservativedailypost.com/android-co-founder-accused-of-running-sex-slave-ring/> )

- **The [Sergy Brin 3-way sex romp scandal](#)**

( <https://nexter.org/google-sex-scandal-sergey-brin-playboy-book-alleges> )

- **[The Steve Bing Case](#)**

( <https://newspunch.com/steve-bing-clinton-friend-associate-epstein-links-dead/> )

- **The [Hydrant investigation](#)**

( [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation\\_Hydrant](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Hydrant) )

- **The [Elon Musk Steve Jurvetson billionaire sex parties](#) scandals**

( <https://pagesix.com/2018/02/12/elon-musk-sported-interesting-getup-at-alleged-sex-party/> )

- **The [NXIVM sexual slave](#) cases**

( <https://www.oxygen.com/crime-time/nxivm-sex-slave-details-horrific-allegations-against-keith-raniere> )

- **The [Michael Goguen anal sex slave case](#)**

( <https://www.news.com.au/finance/tech-titan-michael-goguen-of-sequioa-capital-kept-amber-baptiste-as-a-sex-slave-for-13-years/news-story/91012180fc3b23d50c1e6be8105c92e7> )

- **[The Tom Perkins Hooker Parties](#)**

<https://fortune.com/2018/01/02/brotopia-book-silicon-valley-sex-party/>

**Thousands of divorce and corruption cases including [federal divorce court filings](#) at <https://www.pacer.gov/>**

This [group of people](#) have proven themselves, over and over, to be [sociopath control freaks](#) not fit for participation in public commerce, public policy or media control.

<https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/09/19/551810814/silicon-valley-s-ellen-pao-tackles-sex-discrimination-workplace-diversity-in-mem>

<https://nypost.com/2018/01/03/book-details-tech-bros-drug-fueled-sex-parties-in-silicon-valley/>

[The Four Seasons Hotel](#) and [Rosewood Hotels](#) in [Silicon Valley](#) are estimated to engage in over \$30,000.00 of high-end escort sex trafficking per day, a portion of it managed by [Eastern Bloc Mafia operators](#).

<https://www.thedailybeast.com/silicon-valleys-sex-workers-are-being-priced-out-of-the-city-by-their-own-clients>

<https://escortontop.com/hotel-escorts.htm>

<https://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2013/05/silicon-valley-cougar-nights-love>

<https://www.quora.com/Do-escorts-really-use-the-Rosewood-Hotel-lobby-bar-in-Menlo-Park>

### **The Elon Musk sex perversions**

( <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8426719/Cara-Delevingne-three-way-affair-Amber-Heard-Elon-Musk.html> )

At least 10 Ukrainian escorts fly in and out of SFO and SJO airports every week for these Cartel members. Google boss David Drummond engaged in horrible philandering sexual violations of his wife yet Google covers up every story about it on the web. [Google's Eric Schmidt is under massive investigation.](#)

[http://american-corruption.com/Eric\\_Schmidt\\_Has\\_A\\_Psychotic\\_Need\\_To\\_Control\\_Governments\\_And\\_Society.html](http://american-corruption.com/Eric_Schmidt_Has_A_Psychotic_Need_To_Control_Governments_And_Society.html)

You hear about the female victims of this sex cult but you rarely hear about the young male victims. One of their vast numbers of prostitutes is quoted as saying that the girls and boys are paid "*not just for sex but for the oligarch's endless need to feel that they can control anyone for any reason...*". Multiple attorney general's controlled by their cartel, ie: [Eric Schneiderman](#) and [Eliot Spitzer](#) , are involved this these sex rings.

<https://newspunch.com/eric-schneiderman-nxivm-child-sex-slaves-clintons/>

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliot\\_Spitzer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliot_Spitzer)

*The police and court reports on these political figures financed by this sex Cartel include: Illinois State Representative, **Keith Farnham**, who has resigned and was charged with possession of child pornography and has been accused of bragging at an online site about sexually molesting a 6-year-old girl; Spokesperson for the Arkansas Democratic Party, **Harold Moody, Jr**, who was charged with distribution and possession of child pornography; Radnor Township Board of Commissioners member, **Philip Ahr**, who resigned from his position after being charged with possession of child pornography and abusing children between 2 and 6 years-old; Activist and BLM organizer, **Charles Wade**, who was arrested and charged with human trafficking and underage prostitution; Texas attorney and activist, **Mark Benavides**, who was charged with having sex with a minor, inducing a child under 18 to have sex and compelling prostitution of at least nine legal clients and possession of child pornography, he was found guilty on six counts of sex trafficking; Virginia Delegate, **Joe Morrissey**, who was indicted on charges connected to his relationship with a 17-year-old girl and was charged with supervisory indecent liberties with a minor, electronic solicitation of a minor, possession of child pornography and distribution of child pornography; Massachusetts Congressman, **Gerry Studds**, who was censured by the House of Representatives after he admitted to an inappropriate relationship with a 17-year-old page; Former Mayor of Stillwater, New York, **Rick Nelson** who was plead guilty to five counts of possession of child pornography of children less than 16 years of age; Mayor of Clayton, New York, **Dale Kenyon**, who was indicted for sexual acts against a teenager; Former Mayor of Hubbard, Ohio, **Richard Keenan**, who was given a life sentence in jail for raping a 4-year-old girl; Former Mayor of*

Winston, Oregon, **Kenneth Barrett**, who was arrested for setting up a meeting to have sex with a 14-year-old girl who turned out to be a police officer; The Mayor of Randolph, Nebraska, **Dwayne L. Schutt**, who was arrested and charged with four counts of felony third-degree sexual assault of a child and one count of intentional child abuse. The associates political figures financed by this sex Cartel also include: The Former Mayor of Dawson, Georgia, **Christopher Wright**, who was indicted on the charges of aggravated child molestation, aggravated sodomy, rape, child molestation and statutory rape of an 11-year-old boy and a 12-year-old girl; Former Mayor of Stockton, California, **Anthony Silva**, who was charged with providing alcohol to young adults during a game of strip poker that included a 16-year-old boy at a camp for underprivileged children run by the mayor; Former Mayor of Millbrook, New York, **Donald Briggs**, who was arrested and charged with inappropriate sexual contact with a person younger than 17; The party leader for Victoria County, Texas, **Stephen Jabbour**, who plead guilty to possession and receiving over half a million child pornographic images; DNC activist and fundraiser, **Terrence Bean**, who was arrested on charges of sodomy and sex abuse in a case involving a 15-year-old boy; DNC Party Chairman for Davidson County, Tennessee, **Rodney Mullin**, who resigned amid child pornography allegations; DNC activist, **Andrew Douglas Reed**, who pleaded guilty to multiple counts of 2nd-degree sexual exploitation of a minor for producing child pornography; DNC official from Terre Haute, Indiana, **David Roberts** who was sentenced to federal prison for producing and possessing child pornography including placing hidden cameras in the bedrooms and bathrooms at a home he shared with two minor female victims; Democratic California Congressman, **Tony Cárdenas**, who is being sued in LA County for allegedly sexually abused a 16-year-old girl; Democratic aide to Senator **Barbara Boxer**, **Jeff Rosato**, who plead guilty to charges of trading in child pornography; Alaskan State Representative, **Dean Westlake**, who resigned from his seat after the media published a report alleging he fathered a child with a 16-year-old girl when he was 28; New Jersey State Assemblyman, **Neil Cohen**, who was convicted of possession and distribution of child pornography; DNC donor and billionaire, **Jeffrey Epstein**, ran an underage child sex brothel for The Commission and was convicted of soliciting underage girls for prostitution; New York Congressman, **Anthony Weiner**, who plead guilty to transferring obscene material to a minor as part of a plea agreement for sexted and sending Twitter DMs to underage girls as young as 15; DNC donor, activist, and Hollywood producer **Harvey Weinstein** is being criminally prosecuted and civilly sued for years of sexual abuse (that was well known “secret” in Hollywood) including underage sexual activities with aspiring female actresses; DNC activist and #metoo proponent, **Asia Argento**, settled a lawsuit for sexual harassment stemming from sexual activities with an underage actor; Mayor of Racine, Wisconsin, **Gary Becker**, who was convicted of attempted child seduction, child pornography, and other child sex crimes; Democratic Seattle Mayor **Ed Murray** resigned after multiple accusations of child sexual abuse were levied against him including by family members; San Francisco Mayoral candidate **John Molinari** had his daughter removed from his home by San Francisco Police for his abuse of her according to SFPD reports; San Francisco Mayoral candidate **Roger Boas** was arrested for running an underage sex brothel which catered to San Francisco political elite; DNC activist and aid to NYC Mayor De Blasio, **Jacob Schwartz** was arrested on possession of 3,000+ child pornographic images; Democratic activist and actor, **Russell Simmons**, was sued based on an allegation of sexual assault where he coerced an underage model for sex; DNC Governor of Oregon, **Neil Goldschmidt**, after being caught by a newspaper, publicly admitted to having a past sexual



relationship with a 13-year-old girl after the statute of limitations on the rape charges had expired; Democratic Illinois Congressman, **Mel Reynolds** resigned from Congress after he was convicted of statutory rape of a 16-year-old campaign volunteer; Democratic New York Congressman, **Fred Richmond**, was arrested in Washington D.C. for soliciting sex from a 16-year-old boy; Democratic activist, donor, and director, **Roman Polanski**, fled the country after pleading guilty to statutory rape of a 13-year-old girl - Democrats and Hollywood actors still defend him to this day, including, **Whoopi Goldberg, Martin Scorsese, Woody Allen, David Lynch, Wim Wenders, Pedro Almodovar, Tilda Swinton and Monica Bellucci**; Democratic State Senator from Alaska, **George Jacko**, was found guilty of sexual harassment of an underage legislative page; Democratic State Representative candidate for Colorado, **Andrew Myers**, was convicted for possession of child pornography and enticing children; Illinois Congressman, **Gus Savage** was investigated by the Democrat-controlled House Committee on Ethics for attempting to rape an underage female Peace Corps volunteer in Zaire; Activist, donor, and spokesperson for Subway, **Jared Fogle**, was convicted of distribution and receipt of child pornography and traveling to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor; State Department official, **Carl Carey**, under **Hillary Clinton's** state department, was arrested on ten counts of child porn possession; Maine Assistant Attorney General, **James Cameron**, was sentenced to just over 15 years in federal prison for seven counts of child porn possession, receipt and transmission; Leading DNC boss and financier **Ed Buck** was arrested for killing gay prostitutes and running a sex and drug ring; State Department official, **Daniel Rosen**, under **Hillary Clinton's** state department, was arrested and charged with allegedly soliciting sex from a minor over the internet; State Department official, **James Cafferty**, pleaded guilty to one count of transportation of child pornography; Democratic radio host, **Bernie Ward**, plead guilty to one count of sending child pornography over the Internet; Democratic deputy attorney general from California, **Raymond Liddy**, was arrested for possession of child pornography. There are **THOUSANDS** of other sex crime cases involving associates of the tech Cartel. All of these perpetrators had financing from and social and political direction from the Silicon Valley controlling perpetrators.

An inordinate number of the [members are closeted homosexuals](#) who seek to use their [media monopolies and massive lobbyist ownership's](#) to [promote child sex](#) and child sex change consideration.

<https://nationalnewsnetwork.net/video/the-silicon-valley-mafia-cartel>

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PayPal\\_Mafia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PayPal_Mafia)

<https://nypost.com/2016/10/09/the-sex-slave-scandal-that-exposed-pedophile-billionaire-jeffrey-epstein/>

The [massive](#), sudden, [promotion of those issues](#) in all of [their media](#) since they took power in 2008 and pretty much ran the Obama White House.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/20/fashion/silicon-valley-embrace-gay-and-lesbian-community.html>

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Page 96 - EXHIBIT 83 – Case # 22-cv-1107-TSH, Norcal 9th District.pdf

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Page 97 - EXHIBIT 83 – Case # 22-cv-1107-TSH, Norcal 9th District.pdf

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Page 98 - EXHIBIT 83 – Case # 22-cv-1107-TSH, Norcal 9th District.pdf

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Page 111 - EXHIBIT 83 – Case # 22-cv-1107-TSH, Norcal 9th District.pdf

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## Research

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## **MUCH MORE COMING. STAY TUNED.....**

This isn't even the half of it. Our team has a massive amount of additional sections coming. Of course, as you can see, we have many typo's, spacing adjustments and grammar errors to scrub through. As you may notice from the title page, this is ONLY Volume Two.

We are trying to get the FBI to conduct a new formal interview with us but certain Senators have ordered the FBI NOT to interview us. Why? Because, by law, the FBI has to write-up a "302 Report" on the interview and file that report with the government. Any Congress member could then order a copy of that report and read it. We record all federal law enforcement interviews and write, and file, our own copies of those reports with the government. Any official who reads those 302 reports, or our versions, or both, will immediately call for the arrest of a large part of Congress and their financiers. Some crooked politicians are seeking to cover up their crimes by stopping federal investigators from getting them. Alas, we have made certain that every single crook in this caper is going down; one way or another.

Crooks: Consider these books to be public 302 reports!

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